CHINA
22 March 2014
China's democratic future??
Minxin Pei recently wrote an interesting piece speculating on how China could become a democracy. But will China's future really be democratic? Could China even break up, like the former USSR?
Minxin Pei recently wrote an interesting piece speculating on how China could become a democracy. But will China's future really be democratic? Could China even break up, like the former USSR?
Why should Minxin Pei decide to explore the issue of China's possible democratic future?
With its annual per capita income of around $9,000 (PPP terms), China is already well into the “zone of democratic transition”. Based on historical and statistical analysis, democratic transitions of authoritarian regimes become more likely once income rises above $1,000 per capita. This likelihood increases more dramatically above $4,000, and few authoritarian regimes, unless they rule in oil-producing countries, can survive once per capita income hits more than $6,000. In fact, China's per capita income is comparable to those of South Korea and Taiwan in the mid-1980s on the eve of their democratic transitions.
There are two principal causes of the decline and collapse of authoritarian rule.
First, there is authoritarian decay, reflected in escalating corruption, deteriorating governance, and growing alienation of the masses. China's long decaying regime is beginning to resemble others that also decayed. The 63 year rule of China's Communist Party is now approaching the 74 years of the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the 71 years and 73 years respectively of the one-party regimes in Mexico and Taiwan.
Second, there are the effects of socioeconomic change -- rising literacy, income, and urbanization rates, along with the improvement of communications technologies -- which make it increasingly difficult and ultimately impossible for authoritarian regimes to maintain their rule.
So if there is a strong possibility of a democratic transition in China in the coming 10-15 years, “how will such a transition happen?”, asks Minxin Pei. He sees five possible scenarios.
A “Happy ending” could take place, as in Burma today. A legitimacy crisis, caused by poor economic performance, military defeat, rising popular resistance, unbearable costs of repression, or endemic corruption, could convince some leaders that their days are numbered and lead to a graceful withdrawal from power.
“Gorby comes to China” is a variation of the “happy ending” scenario. China’s leadership misses the historic opportunity to start the reform now. But finally the regime is forced to face reality, hardliners are replaced by reformers. But political chaos leads to the collapse of the Party’s rule, either as a result of elections that boot its loyalists out of power or spontaneous seizure of power by the opposition.
“Tiananmen redux” could also result from continuing to resist reform. There is an unanticipated mass revolt that mobilizes a wide range of social groups nationwide, like Tiananmen in 1989, but the China military refuses to intervene again to save the Party.
“Financial meltdown” could initiate a democratic transition in China, like the collapse of Suharto in Indonesia in 1997-98. The Chinese bank-based financial system also suffers politicization, cronyism, corruption, poor regulation, and weak risk management which have led to huge non-performing loans and capital flight. A financial sector meltdown could grind the economy to a halt and social unrest could become uncontrollable.
“Environmental collapse” (the last regime change scenario) has already started to alienate the urban middle-class from the regime and triggered growing social protest. Environmental activism can become a political force linking different social groups together. A catastrophic environmental disaster -- a massive toxic spill, record drought, or extended period of poisonous smog -- could trigger a mass protest incident that opens the door for the rapid political mobilization of the opposition.
Minxin Pei analysis is fascinating, and sobering. As he concludes, "it should become blindingly clear that we need to start thinking about both the unthinkable and the inevitable".
But China's future may not necessarily be democratic. It is also possible to envisage even more complex scenarios. Here are two that spring to mind.
In response to political and social chaos, the military could take over, taking China backwards in terms of economic and social freedoms, and economic development. China's left-wing, with its fond memories of Mao, has very strong support. A military takeover could be facilitated by a quick exodus of many members of the elite to safe havens, especially Western countries like the US, Canada and Australia, where they may already have permanent residence status or family members.
Another scenario could even be the break away of some provinces like Guangdong, which are very distant and economically independent from Beijing. The leaders of China's richest province could be very happy to become independent.
What ever happens -- and something is bound to happen sooner or later -- social and political instability in China could have massive spillover effects on the rest of the world.
As Minxin Pei argues, China's new leadership has a window of opportunity for a political soft landing. But the risk is that it will resist reform until it is too late.
A recent document from the Communist Party's Central Committee General Office reportedly warned of the need to strengthen internet management against the dangers of western ideas and "erroneous currents of thought". And the new government, in power for only a few months, appears to have launched a new offensive, closing the social media accounts of some influential opponents.
At this stage, continued social and political repression, rather than opening up, seems to be the policy.
Executive Director
Asian Century Institute
www.asiancenturyinstitute.com
Why should Minxin Pei decide to explore the issue of China's possible democratic future?
With its annual per capita income of around $9,000 (PPP terms), China is already well into the “zone of democratic transition”. Based on historical and statistical analysis, democratic transitions of authoritarian regimes become more likely once income rises above $1,000 per capita. This likelihood increases more dramatically above $4,000, and few authoritarian regimes, unless they rule in oil-producing countries, can survive once per capita income hits more than $6,000. In fact, China's per capita income is comparable to those of South Korea and Taiwan in the mid-1980s on the eve of their democratic transitions.
There are two principal causes of the decline and collapse of authoritarian rule.
First, there is authoritarian decay, reflected in escalating corruption, deteriorating governance, and growing alienation of the masses. China's long decaying regime is beginning to resemble others that also decayed. The 63 year rule of China's Communist Party is now approaching the 74 years of the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the 71 years and 73 years respectively of the one-party regimes in Mexico and Taiwan.
Second, there are the effects of socioeconomic change -- rising literacy, income, and urbanization rates, along with the improvement of communications technologies -- which make it increasingly difficult and ultimately impossible for authoritarian regimes to maintain their rule.
So if there is a strong possibility of a democratic transition in China in the coming 10-15 years, “how will such a transition happen?”, asks Minxin Pei. He sees five possible scenarios.
A “Happy ending” could take place, as in Burma today. A legitimacy crisis, caused by poor economic performance, military defeat, rising popular resistance, unbearable costs of repression, or endemic corruption, could convince some leaders that their days are numbered and lead to a graceful withdrawal from power.
“Gorby comes to China” is a variation of the “happy ending” scenario. China’s leadership misses the historic opportunity to start the reform now. But finally the regime is forced to face reality, hardliners are replaced by reformers. But political chaos leads to the collapse of the Party’s rule, either as a result of elections that boot its loyalists out of power or spontaneous seizure of power by the opposition.
“Tiananmen redux” could also result from continuing to resist reform. There is an unanticipated mass revolt that mobilizes a wide range of social groups nationwide, like Tiananmen in 1989, but the China military refuses to intervene again to save the Party.
“Financial meltdown” could initiate a democratic transition in China, like the collapse of Suharto in Indonesia in 1997-98. The Chinese bank-based financial system also suffers politicization, cronyism, corruption, poor regulation, and weak risk management which have led to huge non-performing loans and capital flight. A financial sector meltdown could grind the economy to a halt and social unrest could become uncontrollable.
“Environmental collapse” (the last regime change scenario) has already started to alienate the urban middle-class from the regime and triggered growing social protest. Environmental activism can become a political force linking different social groups together. A catastrophic environmental disaster -- a massive toxic spill, record drought, or extended period of poisonous smog -- could trigger a mass protest incident that opens the door for the rapid political mobilization of the opposition.
Minxin Pei analysis is fascinating, and sobering. As he concludes, "it should become blindingly clear that we need to start thinking about both the unthinkable and the inevitable".
But China's future may not necessarily be democratic. It is also possible to envisage even more complex scenarios. Here are two that spring to mind.
In response to political and social chaos, the military could take over, taking China backwards in terms of economic and social freedoms, and economic development. China's left-wing, with its fond memories of Mao, has very strong support. A military takeover could be facilitated by a quick exodus of many members of the elite to safe havens, especially Western countries like the US, Canada and Australia, where they may already have permanent residence status or family members.
Another scenario could even be the break away of some provinces like Guangdong, which are very distant and economically independent from Beijing. The leaders of China's richest province could be very happy to become independent.
What ever happens -- and something is bound to happen sooner or later -- social and political instability in China could have massive spillover effects on the rest of the world.
As Minxin Pei argues, China's new leadership has a window of opportunity for a political soft landing. But the risk is that it will resist reform until it is too late.
A recent document from the Communist Party's Central Committee General Office reportedly warned of the need to strengthen internet management against the dangers of western ideas and "erroneous currents of thought". And the new government, in power for only a few months, appears to have launched a new offensive, closing the social media accounts of some influential opponents.
At this stage, continued social and political repression, rather than opening up, seems to be the policy.
Author
John WestExecutive Director
Asian Century Institute
www.asiancenturyinstitute.com