CHINA
22 March 2014
China's BO Xilai affair
The BO Xilai affair is China's biggest scandal since Tiananmen Square. But our Paris-based China watcher, Frederic Langer, argues that the West cannot wash its hands of BO's judiciary troubles.
The BO Xilai affair is China's biggest political scandal since Tiananmen Square. But our Paris-based China watcher, Frederic Langer, argues that the West cannot wash its hands of BO's judiciary troubles.
There is word now out in the press that BO Xilai’s trial, which has been about to take place for a year now, is delayed again because of the accused’s lack of cooperation. Reportedly he wants a political trial, not a criminal one (Le Figaro 24 February).
Almost all of the press commentary has been focussing on scandalous tales of murder, corruption, and political infighting and intrigue. As important as this is, it is also important to look closer at BO's mission in Chongqing, where he was Communist Party leader.
BO had two important tsaks in Chongqing. First, he was to develop this province as a gateway to China's western provinces. He was also supposed to demonstrate that the interior of the country could succeed, as the coastal regions have done, and succeed by relying on the domestic market.
And secondly, BO was supposed to clean up corruption by imposing modern, Western-inspired rules of corporate governance. He implemented this mission in a ruthless way, even by the standards of China, where autocratic methods are unfortunately too frequent. Indeed, his actions spurred a horror reaction and, coincidentally with a criminal case implicating his wife, he was quickly fired and detained under accusations of corruption and excessive autocratic behavior.
Amidst all the media noises, some important issues have not been addressed. For example, did the Chongqing municipality (31 million inhabitants) fare well under his direction and has it fared better since he left? Has corporate governance in this remote part of China improved?
And behind these questions lies the deeper question of why he resorted to violent behavior against local managers of state-owned enterprises in order to improve corporate governance.
BO does have a record of ruthlessness as evidenced by his inhuman suppression of the Buddhist movement Falun Gong when he was governor of Dalian. And he is a partisan of a return to the methods of Mao and his rash methods of popular mobilization.
But the deeper answers lie in the fundamental challenges of implementing modern Western principles of corporate governance which require deep and fundamental changes in local management of state-owned enterprises in this underdeveloped region and can require violence to be implemented.
As the West and Western-dominated organizations like the World Bank and the OECD push for a rapid reforms of the Chinese economy, we must recognize that many reforms may only be possible by strong-armed methods. Further, there is always the risk that we incite energetic leaders like BO to trample on human rights in pursuit of these economic reforms and go backwards on the hesitant road to political modernization.
This also implies that a more democratic China would be less able to reform its economy as vested interests block change, a fundamental problem that Western countries now have to deal with now.
These issues highlight the deep complexities of pursuing a rapid reform agenda in China. The Chinese economy is likely to be characterized by a vibrant export-oriented economy and a sleepy, traditional economy for some time to come. And the West will need to be much more patient in its calls for reform.
There is word now out in the press that BO Xilai’s trial, which has been about to take place for a year now, is delayed again because of the accused’s lack of cooperation. Reportedly he wants a political trial, not a criminal one (Le Figaro 24 February).
Almost all of the press commentary has been focussing on scandalous tales of murder, corruption, and political infighting and intrigue. As important as this is, it is also important to look closer at BO's mission in Chongqing, where he was Communist Party leader.
BO had two important tsaks in Chongqing. First, he was to develop this province as a gateway to China's western provinces. He was also supposed to demonstrate that the interior of the country could succeed, as the coastal regions have done, and succeed by relying on the domestic market.
And secondly, BO was supposed to clean up corruption by imposing modern, Western-inspired rules of corporate governance. He implemented this mission in a ruthless way, even by the standards of China, where autocratic methods are unfortunately too frequent. Indeed, his actions spurred a horror reaction and, coincidentally with a criminal case implicating his wife, he was quickly fired and detained under accusations of corruption and excessive autocratic behavior.
Amidst all the media noises, some important issues have not been addressed. For example, did the Chongqing municipality (31 million inhabitants) fare well under his direction and has it fared better since he left? Has corporate governance in this remote part of China improved?
And behind these questions lies the deeper question of why he resorted to violent behavior against local managers of state-owned enterprises in order to improve corporate governance.
BO does have a record of ruthlessness as evidenced by his inhuman suppression of the Buddhist movement Falun Gong when he was governor of Dalian. And he is a partisan of a return to the methods of Mao and his rash methods of popular mobilization.
But the deeper answers lie in the fundamental challenges of implementing modern Western principles of corporate governance which require deep and fundamental changes in local management of state-owned enterprises in this underdeveloped region and can require violence to be implemented.
As the West and Western-dominated organizations like the World Bank and the OECD push for a rapid reforms of the Chinese economy, we must recognize that many reforms may only be possible by strong-armed methods. Further, there is always the risk that we incite energetic leaders like BO to trample on human rights in pursuit of these economic reforms and go backwards on the hesitant road to political modernization.
This also implies that a more democratic China would be less able to reform its economy as vested interests block change, a fundamental problem that Western countries now have to deal with now.
These issues highlight the deep complexities of pursuing a rapid reform agenda in China. The Chinese economy is likely to be characterized by a vibrant export-oriented economy and a sleepy, traditional economy for some time to come. And the West will need to be much more patient in its calls for reform.