Paul Keating’s grand ambitions for Australia

It is a widely held perception in Australia that while Paul Keating was a great Treasurer (1983-91), he was somewhat disappointing in his subsequent role as Prime Minister (1991-96).

But James Curran’s recent book, “Grand Ambition: Paul Keating's global vision for Australia”, offers a quite different perspective on Keating’s prime ministership, thanks to access to previously unavailable documents and many meetings with Keating himself. Curran, a professor of modern history at the University of Sydney, has unearthed the inside story on Keating’s term of office by meeting the key players of the time, and offers readers a very engaging and fascinating read.

Timing matters

In politics, as in life more generally, timing can be everything. Keating became prime minister of Australia on 20 December 1991, just a few days before the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union, on December 26, 1991. Keating believed that with the end of the Cold War, Australia needed to be independent in ways that it had never been before. The habit of dependence on the US inhibited the ability of Australians to understand Asia on its own terms.

Keating was also in place to receive the official visit of US President George H.W. Bush, from 31 December 31, 1991, to 3 January 1992, marking the first visit to Australia by a sitting American president since Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967. It was initially envisaged that Bush would be received by Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke, a onetime golfing buddy, but nternal Labor Party politics led to the overthrow of Hawke. Queen Elizabeth II also visited Australia in February 1992 inciting controversial commentary in light of Keating’s republican ambitions for Australia.

Individuals also matter

Curran writes that some individuals in Keating’s team played an outsized role – as individuals frequently do in the march of history. One of the key individuals was foreign policy advisor Allan Gyngell, who stayed close with Keating even after he left power. Gyngell was exasperated that the most important multilateral forums that Australian leaders attended were the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting and the Pacific Islands Forum! Australia deserved a seat at the big table of international relations, where the big decisions were made.

So at Gyngell’s suggestion, Keating made the most of Bush’s visit by convincing him, and then President Bill Clinton, who succeeded him in January 1993, to elevate APEC’s stature by holding leaders' meetings (until then APEC had been an organisation where ministers and senior officials mainly focussed on trade and economic issues). Keating warned Bush that the US should not retreat back home and turn protectionist in the new post- Cold War world. The US must stay involved in the Asia Pacific especially for economic issues. This is but one example of Australia being a “good ally” who once spoke openly and fearlessly to the US.

APEC Leaders' Meetings

Thus, the first-ever APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting took place in November 1993, hosted by US President Bill Clinton in Washington state. The second was in November 1994, hosted by Indonesian President Suharto Bogor, Indonesia. But it was Keating who was the “de facto secretariat” for both meetings, according to Curran. He convinced Clinton of the importance of an APEC leaders’ meeting, when it didn't seem obvious. He also convinced Indonesia’s Suharto and Japan’s Miyazawa to attend, thereby setting the tone for the region to follow. He even managed to convince the Chinese to attend, even though both Hong Kong and Taiwan would also be there, by labelling the meeting an “economic leaders’ meeting”, rather than a political summit.

Keating recognises that APEC may not have quite the standing today that it had in the 1990s, but its leaders’ meetings have an unbroken tradition. The 34th APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting will be held this year in Shenzhen, China, on 18-19 November. Australia will be sitting at the same table as the leaders from the US, China, Russia, Indonesia and 17 other economies from the Asia-Pacific – something that did not occur prior to Keating’s initiative to hold APEC leaders’ meetings. APEC leaders’ meetings also laid the foundations for an enhanced international role for Australia in future international summitry, notably the G20 and the East Asia Summit.

The Indonesian connection

As Curran explains, Keating understood Indonesia, Australia’s closest large neighbour, in a way that his predecessors never did. He waxes lyrical about the great mutual respect between the two leaders. Keating broke with the Australian security establishment’s deep suspicion of Indonesia by negotiating in total secrecy with President Suharto a bilateral defense pact, signed by the two leaders in December 1995. In the background was the thought that a rising China might tip the regional balance of power, if its ascent matched that of the East Asian tiger economies. And the Indonesian archipelago, which spans more than 5000 kilometres east-west, from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, can act as protection for Australia.

While Indonesia officially abrogated the agreement in September 1999 during the East Timor crisis, suspicion never returned to the relationship, writes Curran. This enabled Australia to spend much less on national defence than otherwise. The treaty served as the architectural blueprint for the Jakarta Treaty, a major bilateral defense and strategic agreement signed in February 2026 by Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto in February 2026.

Curran argues that no previous prime ministers invested in an Asian agenda with the urgency and intensity of Keating. Asia was on Keating’s mind from an early age, as his father’s brother was executed by the Japanese on the Sandakan Death Marches during World War II. The 50th anniversary of the end of World War II coincided with Keating’s prime ministership and provided him the opportunity to highlight the important role that Australia played in the Pacific War in his many speeches and media work – thereby rebalancing the Eurocentric traditional ANZAC myth.

Keating’s vision for Australia

These important initiatives must be seen in the context of Keating’s
strategic vision for Australia, building on his economic reforms as
Treasurer, which modernised and globalised the Australian economy,
according to Curran. In essence, Keating’s strategic vision for Australia
was an independent republic, reconciled with its first nation peoples, finding its security “in Asia” through regional integration, trade, and cooperative diplomacy rather than “seeking security from Asia” by relying on external Western protectors like the US. What is unique is Keating’s integrated vision, tightly knitting together history, politics, economics, society, and international relations. In sum, he wanted his prime ministership to be the cultural bookend to his seismic economic reforms.

Keating believed that Australia should have greater self confidence and an independent foreign policy rather than submitting itself to priorities of an unreliable foreign power. He is not opposed to Australia’s alliance with the US. It has a role to play as an “offshore balancer” against the powerful China, but it should not seek to “contain” China. Keating has always believed that Australia is on its own and that relying on great powers is an error of judgment, as we saw during World War 2. In sum, Australia is well capable of defending itself, should have an independent foreign policy, and should not fear expressing its views to the US.

What’s left of Keatingism?

Many would say that Keating has left no legacy. His successor, Prime Minister John Howard, and those who followed did not embrace Keating’s ambitions for Australia. Nor have any important economic reforms been implemented since Howard's introduction of a goods and services tax in 2000 – one reason for Australia’s subsequent weak productivity performance.

All that said, Keating’s APEC legacy remains in itself, and as forerunner to Australia’s participation in the G20 and East Asian Summit. Subsequent leaders have continued Keating’s Asian agenda through free trade agreements and other initiatives, even if they have lacked Keating’s enthusiasm. And Australia’s special relationship with its closest big neighbour, Indonesia, continues with the Albanese government’s signature of the Jakarta Treaty.

Keating’s continuing relevance

While Keating may have left office some three decades ago, his voice (often vociferous) remains, especially when it comes to AUKUS and the Australia/US alliance. Keating is very critical of Australia's unquestioning embrace of the US alliance, and AUKUS which seems to be more focused on helping protect US interests in the Indo-Pacific than defending Australia.

Moreover, the growing number of US bases in Australia greatly compromises our sovereignty as these bases could be used for military operations which are not in Australia’s interests, and could become targets in any conflict. And Australia has left itself at the whim of erratic American leaders like Donald Trump – a big strategic gamble.

For Keating, Australia’s loss of sovereignty is the great scandal of our times. Former Labor leader Simon Green's speech of opposition to the Iraq war in 2003 is probably Labor's last stand on a more self-reliant Australian foreign policy.

Keating’s continued outspokenness ruffles many feathers. But he has provoked a deeper reflection on many complex issues. And a wide range of the elite Australian opinion seems to agree with him that AUKUS is not in Australia’s interests, and it is unlikely to ever come to fruition. The current Albanese government was apparently so shaken by Keating’s commentary that they have brought him in from the cold and are closely consulting with him. Albanese is even drawing on Keatingism by speaking of Australia finding its security in Asia rather than from Asia.

The inability of Albanese and most of his predecessors to speak with conviction about Australia's suite of strategic and economic challenges is despairing when the country faces virtually intractable challenges caught between Xi’s China and Trump’s America. For anyone visiting Australia regularly, as I do, perhaps the greatest problem Australia faces is complacency and a lack of deep appreciation of its challenges. Curran’s excellent book could be just the tonic that the country needs to awaken from its geopolitical slumber.

Australia may not have been ready for some dimensions of Keatingism in the early 1990s, having just digested great meals of economic reform in the previous decade. But today, the need for a new direction seems obvious, as reflected in the widespread disenchantment with Australia’s major political parties and the rise of the far right “One Nation” party and a plethora of “independent” politicians.

Some analysts believe that Keating’s highly combative manner is unlikely to persuade Australians. But the larrikan from Bankstown, who has proved his metal many times over, still has a large following who admire his willingness to challenge orthodoxy and forgive him for his vanity and exaggerations of his contributions to Australian foreign and economic policy.