Merkel not to blame for all of Germany’s problems

For much of the 16 years of her chancellorship, Angela Merkel was a revered figure. She was frequently referred to as the de facto leader of the European Union and the most powerful woman in the world. She seemed a calm and wise leader who solved complex issues both at home in Germany and in Europe. And she was the only modern German chancellor to depart office voluntarily. However, opinions became more critical during the final years of her chancellorship, and during the three years since her retirement – especially in light of her government’s refugee policy and management of Germany's relationship with Russia.

There was thus great anticipation surrounding the recent publication of her memoirs entitled Freedom: Memoirs 1954 – 2021. Most of the initial reactions of the commentariat have been critical. Her memoirs are a weighty tome of over 700 pages, packed with detailed information, but which reveal very little which is new. They are very descriptive, with little analysis or new sights, no admission of mistakes, and most disappointingly no scoops, despite her frank and critical assessments of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump.

For this reader at least, there is still much of great interest to learn from Merkel's memoirs. It offers fascinating insights into the greyness of daily life in East Germany where she grew up. The "Freedom" in her book's title, a leitmotif for her career, was obviously inspired by the lack of freedom in East Germany. Unlike many people in Germany’s former East German states, Merkel has no nostalgia for life in East Germany.

This book is clearly the product of a leader who was very much on top of the issues of the day -- something which cannot be said about all the world's leaders. Her command of the details of public policy, as well as the meticulous writing style of her memoirs, may reflect her academic training as a PhD scientist. And all through her rise to the top of German politics, there was no hint of corruption or foul play, with her strong moral fibre always shining through.

Perhaps the issue that has tarnished her reputation the most was the decision in 2015 to allow about one million Syrian refugees to enter into Germany. This decision was a reflection of her strong humanist values. Merkel argues that she could not just allow these refugees to suffer and possibly die at the German border. And while today Merkel is severely criticised for this decision, which has contributed to the rise of the far-right political party, Alternative for Germany, at the time many German people in fact welcomed these refugees.

Another sore point among the international commentariat has been Germany's failure, until very recently, to honour its NATO commitment to spend 2 percent of its GDP on national defence. Merkel's response is that the German legislature would not agree to that, although it has since done so in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It has taken both Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump to convince the German political elite that they need to take national security more seriously. But even now, some three years after Merkel’s retirement, it is still not clear that Germany has the full measure of the challenge.

Under Merkel's watch, Germany became even more reliant on Russian natural gas, something which was only exacerbated by her sudden decision to phase out nuclear energy. Germany was long motivated by the misguided philosophy of "change through trade", meaning that increased trade between Germany and Russia would lead to improved governance in Russia, and more cooperative relations between the two countries. Not only did this not occur, but Germany was left vulnerable to Russian “natural gas coercion”.

The natural gas relationship with Russia highlights at least two aspects of Germany's foreign policy which predate Merkel's chancellorship, and continued under her watch. German big business exerted strong influence over German foreign policy to maintain access to cheap Russian natural gas. Indeed, Merkel’s approach to decision making often seems to be more of a mediator of different interest groups, especially business, than a decisive leader.

But with economics dominating national security in Germany's foreign policy formulation, Germany has been indirectly financing Russia’s bad behaviour vis–a-vis Ukraine and elsewhere. More generally the two countries’ shared history, and the entanglements between their political elites (involving notably former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder), mean that Germany is often willing to overlook Russian bad behaviour.

Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and many commentators argue that Russia would never have invaded Ukraine if NATO had given it a Membership Action Plan at the summit in Bucharest in April 2008 (the Russian invasion occurred shortly after Merkel’s retirement). Under pressure from Merkel and France’s President Sarkozy NATO merely declared that both Ukraine and Georgia would become members, without offering a Plan (in reality a Plan would have only begun the process of joining NATO and not have provided immediate NATO protection). Merkel is adamant on this point – she feared that offering a Plan would antagonise Russia and perhaps accelerate possible conflict. But the refusal to give Ukraine and Georgia NATO Plan, did not stop Russia’s invasion of these countries, thereby casting doubt on Merkel’s position.

For Merkel, diplomacy was the way to manage Putin’s designs on Ukraine. And she invested much time and energy in that, despite Putin’s often obnoxious behaviour towards her. But unfortunately, Putin’s unwillingness to engage in diplomacy during Covid-19, out of fear of becoming infected, cut off the diplomatic channel, inhibited efforts to maintain peace, according to Merkel. Critics may say that diplomacy is a wasted effort with Russia in light of its chronic lying and cheating in international relations. But even the current conflict in Ukraine will ultimately require a diplomatic settlement.

In time, historians may look upon Merkel’s chancellorship as covering a most tumultuous period in world history. Key events and issues were: the global financial crisis, Euro crisis, Brexit, European migration crisis, Donald Trump 1.0, Covid 19, and unconvincing attempts to tackle climate change. It was also the period of the passing of the myth that large emerging economies like China and Russia might become partners in the rules-based world order.

Leading a country like Germany through these times is not easy because it is so steeped in tradition and resistant to change, and still haunted by World War 2 guilt. Since Merkel’s retirement, Germany has confirmed the great lesson of political economy – namely that countries invariably only make big changes when confronted with a crisis. Thus, the new German government has reacted quickly to increase defence expenditure, and to recalibrate its relationship with Russia following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and there is also talk that nuclear power may be reinstated. But Germany’s coalition politics will always inhibit decisive leadership, as current political instability confirms.

Europe today is in an invidious situation, having to deal with the unresolved Russian problem, other authoritarian leaders like China’s Xi and Turkey’s Erdoğan, the return of Donald Trump to the White House, political instability in France and Germany, and a loss of public support for the European Union. And it needs strong and competent leadership from Germany and France, something which it does not have at the moment.

But laying full responsibility for Germany’s and Europe’s current challenges at the feet of Angela Merkel would be too simplistic. In this context, her memoirs provide fascinating insights into her long chancellorship, and are well worth reading.