ASEAN
02 April 2018
The Rise of Duterte -- a book review
Richard Javad Heydarian's recent book, "The Rise of Duterte: a popular revolt against elite democracy", provides excellent insights into Philippine's turbulent politics, writes John West.
In his new book, Richard Heydarian argues that the rise of populist firebrand Rodrigo Duterte to the presidency of the Philippines in 2016 was the result of three decades of failed elite democracy. The 1986 People Power Revolution, that deposed the corrupt regime of Ferdinand Marcos, did not deliver on the promise of a return to democracy. The Revolution merely saw a return to power of the Philippines' old elites.
In telling his story in this wonderful little book, Heydarian takes us on a journey through the Philippines' modern politics and foreign policy. He also frames his argument in a theoretical and comparative framework, with references to Aristotle, Plato, Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama and Fareed Zakaria, as well as the failed democracies in Iran, Russia and Turkey.
Heydarian argues that recent years have seen liberal elites throughout the world suffer one electoral setback after another, as demagogues and strongman populists dislodge the establishment, resulting in authoritarian regimes and illiberal democracy. "Often the culprit ... is the absence of functioning state institutions, which have the capacity to discipline rapacious elites, enforce laws, and insulate the bureaucracy from the undue influence of interest groups...".
The rise of Duterte is thus just one of many examples of democratic decay and democratic fatigue. Heydarian argues that Duterte's rise came on the back of simmering public dissatisfaction with the post-Marco "elite democracy", which failed miserably to live up to its initial promise of social justice and sustainable development. Heydarian refers to this as “grievance politics”. He quotes Walden Bello who said that Duterte “came to power with an anti-crime agenda and an anti-elite and anti-liberal discourse”.
With his surprise victory in the 2016 presidential elections, Duterte is dramatically transforming the Philippines -- from a staunch US ally, with a maturing democracy and booming economy -- to a country with an independent and transactional foreign policy, which is willing to sacrifice human rights for law and order through acceptance of Duterte’s murderous war on drugs. Further, as sociologist Randy David is quoted as saying, Duterte has “unleashed a torrent of aggressive and resentful impulses not previously seen in our society, except perhaps in social media”. And Heydarian reports that he “came under a barrage of systematic cyber-harassment -- mostly from pro-Duterte trolls -- including death threats and myriad of insults levelled against my loved ones and me”.
Duterte's new “independent” foreign policy has several pillars including improving relations with China and Russia, moving away from the country's tight and subservient alignment with the US, and strengthening ties with ASEAN, Japan and other neighbouring countries. His strategic logic is sensible for a smaller country precariously caught between competing superpowers, and is in a part a response to the US’s lack of clear commitment to the Philippines in the South China Sea dispute with China.
Duterte is also clearly miffed by his perceived personal mistreatment by the US (an alleged refusal of a visa application), and the US's historical misdeeds in Mindanao, his home island. Further, Duterte has accepted the reality of China's occupation of the South China Sea, and is leveraging this to get infrastructure financing from China.
Heydarian's story is analytically very impressive and is woven with great skill. But the argument -- that the rise of Duterte is the culmination of three decades of frustration with elite democracy, and that he is part of a global populist trend -- is too simplistic for my liking. The whole post-1986 period in the Philippines has been riddled with populism, most notably with the presidency of former actor Joseph Estrada (1998-2001), and who, despite his record of deep corruption, is still now Mayor of Manila (since 2013). And as Heydarian himself argues, the election of Benigno Aquino (2010-2016) on a moralistic anti-corruption platform, following the corrupt Arroyo regime, and also following the passing of his saintly mother, former President Corazon Aquino (1986-1992), can be seen as a reflection of populism.
In other words, during the post-1986 period, Philippine politics has always gyrated between establishment and populist figures. This is a function of the Philippines' fractured and polarised society, and the inability of both sides of politics to deliver opportunity and prosperity to all Philippine citizens.
Another factor which also played an important role is the Philippines' first-past-the-post presidential election system. While Duterte may now enjoy substantial popular support, he was able to win the presidency with only 39% of the popular vote (Aquino his predecessor won 42%). In other words, Duterte did not win the election with a tidal wave of popular support. Indeed, the combined vote of the two establishment candidates (Mar Roxas -- 23.5%; and Grace Poe -- 21.4%) exceeded that of Duterte.
There were also a couple of points that I did not notice in Heydarian's book. First, the possible influence of vote-buying, a chronic problem in the Philippines, which may have affected the election outcome. And second, there is strangely no mention of the possibility of Russian interference via social media. President Putin is surely very very happy with Duterte’s pivot away from the US and toward China and Russia.
Finally, it should be noted that Duterte's populist presidency could well disappear as surprisingly as it occurred, if his reported poor health deteriorates even further. Under the Philippine political system, Duterte would be replaced by Vice President Leni Robredo, who is an establishment figure, rather than a populist one (in the Philippines, the vice-presidency is subject to a separate election from the presidency).
Notwithstanding these qualifications, Heydarian's book makes for excellent reading for anyone interested in the future of democracy and populism in the Philippines and other emerging economies, as well as the roles of the US and China as great powers in Asia.
In telling his story in this wonderful little book, Heydarian takes us on a journey through the Philippines' modern politics and foreign policy. He also frames his argument in a theoretical and comparative framework, with references to Aristotle, Plato, Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama and Fareed Zakaria, as well as the failed democracies in Iran, Russia and Turkey.
Heydarian argues that recent years have seen liberal elites throughout the world suffer one electoral setback after another, as demagogues and strongman populists dislodge the establishment, resulting in authoritarian regimes and illiberal democracy. "Often the culprit ... is the absence of functioning state institutions, which have the capacity to discipline rapacious elites, enforce laws, and insulate the bureaucracy from the undue influence of interest groups...".
The rise of Duterte is thus just one of many examples of democratic decay and democratic fatigue. Heydarian argues that Duterte's rise came on the back of simmering public dissatisfaction with the post-Marco "elite democracy", which failed miserably to live up to its initial promise of social justice and sustainable development. Heydarian refers to this as “grievance politics”. He quotes Walden Bello who said that Duterte “came to power with an anti-crime agenda and an anti-elite and anti-liberal discourse”.
With his surprise victory in the 2016 presidential elections, Duterte is dramatically transforming the Philippines -- from a staunch US ally, with a maturing democracy and booming economy -- to a country with an independent and transactional foreign policy, which is willing to sacrifice human rights for law and order through acceptance of Duterte’s murderous war on drugs. Further, as sociologist Randy David is quoted as saying, Duterte has “unleashed a torrent of aggressive and resentful impulses not previously seen in our society, except perhaps in social media”. And Heydarian reports that he “came under a barrage of systematic cyber-harassment -- mostly from pro-Duterte trolls -- including death threats and myriad of insults levelled against my loved ones and me”.
Duterte's new “independent” foreign policy has several pillars including improving relations with China and Russia, moving away from the country's tight and subservient alignment with the US, and strengthening ties with ASEAN, Japan and other neighbouring countries. His strategic logic is sensible for a smaller country precariously caught between competing superpowers, and is in a part a response to the US’s lack of clear commitment to the Philippines in the South China Sea dispute with China.
Duterte is also clearly miffed by his perceived personal mistreatment by the US (an alleged refusal of a visa application), and the US's historical misdeeds in Mindanao, his home island. Further, Duterte has accepted the reality of China's occupation of the South China Sea, and is leveraging this to get infrastructure financing from China.
Heydarian's story is analytically very impressive and is woven with great skill. But the argument -- that the rise of Duterte is the culmination of three decades of frustration with elite democracy, and that he is part of a global populist trend -- is too simplistic for my liking. The whole post-1986 period in the Philippines has been riddled with populism, most notably with the presidency of former actor Joseph Estrada (1998-2001), and who, despite his record of deep corruption, is still now Mayor of Manila (since 2013). And as Heydarian himself argues, the election of Benigno Aquino (2010-2016) on a moralistic anti-corruption platform, following the corrupt Arroyo regime, and also following the passing of his saintly mother, former President Corazon Aquino (1986-1992), can be seen as a reflection of populism.
In other words, during the post-1986 period, Philippine politics has always gyrated between establishment and populist figures. This is a function of the Philippines' fractured and polarised society, and the inability of both sides of politics to deliver opportunity and prosperity to all Philippine citizens.
Another factor which also played an important role is the Philippines' first-past-the-post presidential election system. While Duterte may now enjoy substantial popular support, he was able to win the presidency with only 39% of the popular vote (Aquino his predecessor won 42%). In other words, Duterte did not win the election with a tidal wave of popular support. Indeed, the combined vote of the two establishment candidates (Mar Roxas -- 23.5%; and Grace Poe -- 21.4%) exceeded that of Duterte.
There were also a couple of points that I did not notice in Heydarian's book. First, the possible influence of vote-buying, a chronic problem in the Philippines, which may have affected the election outcome. And second, there is strangely no mention of the possibility of Russian interference via social media. President Putin is surely very very happy with Duterte’s pivot away from the US and toward China and Russia.
Finally, it should be noted that Duterte's populist presidency could well disappear as surprisingly as it occurred, if his reported poor health deteriorates even further. Under the Philippine political system, Duterte would be replaced by Vice President Leni Robredo, who is an establishment figure, rather than a populist one (in the Philippines, the vice-presidency is subject to a separate election from the presidency).
Notwithstanding these qualifications, Heydarian's book makes for excellent reading for anyone interested in the future of democracy and populism in the Philippines and other emerging economies, as well as the roles of the US and China as great powers in Asia.