ASIA
30 June 2026
Asia’s uncertain future
After several decades of unprecedented development, Asia today stands at a hinge point.
After several decades of unprecedented development, Asia today stands at a hinge point, writes Nick Bisley in his new book, Asian Crucible: Globalization, Geopolitics and the Contest for the Future. Bisley presents three futures that could come from that contest: one that is fractured, one that is unified and one that is rebalanced.
Asia’s modern resurgence is one of the greatest stories of our era and builds upon an extraordinary arc of history, according to Bisley, a pro vice-chancellor at Australia’s La Trobe University. Just 200 years ago, Asia was dominated by old empires, notably the Qing and Mughal, while Southeast Asia was populated by a range of sultanates, city states and other polities.
A hundred years later, Asia was substantially overrun by Western countries, notably Britain, the Netherlands, France and the United States. China was crumbling as European colonies dotted its seaboard, while Japan’s invasion was penetrating deeper into the country.
With the end of World War II, the idea of empires became anachronistic. The results were decolonisation and the formation of a region of independent states, driven by nationalism. But the borders are mainly colonial artifacts. New states were created, including Indonesia and Malaysia. Issues such as Taiwan and the two Koreas remain unresolved.
Bisley insists that Asia’s Cold War, the period from 1945–79, is really a misnomer, as this was a hot period of conflict and turmoil. At the same time, the Cold War saw the beginning of Asia’s economic acceleration, which started with the rise of Japan followed by Taiwan, South Korea and some Southeast Asian economies.
The normalisation of Sino-American relations in the 1970s boosted the Asian economy, as did China’s economic reform program. A dynamic Asian economy emerged, driven by globalisation, market integration and the development of global value chains, increasingly centred on China. Asia’s rise dwarfed previous historical developments, including the Industrial Revolution.
US regional security assurance complemented these economic factors. At the time, countries such as China may not have liked American primacy but swallowed it because it allowed Asian powers to concentrate on economic development. It is also clear that farsighted leaders such as China’s Deng Xiaoping and US president Bill Clinton made major contributions – something that Bisley could have emphasised more strongly.
But globalisation and market integration, which made China the world’s biggest economy in purchasing-power parity terms today, contained the seeds of their own destruction, according to Bisley. Financial crises emanating from the US and Europe raised questions about globalisation. And in September 2010, a stoush between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands led China to implement a rare-earths export ban, which highlighted how globalisation could be weaponised.
But while nationalism and geopolitics were beginning to surface before 2020, Bisley argues that Covid-19 pandemic was a key tipping point in the geopolitical competition. There was a lack of transparency about the origins of the virus. Supply chains for crucial supplies such as pharmaceuticals and personal protective equipment were weaponised. International cooperation was limited.
Bisley argues that today’s world is characterised by a broken consensus on the importance of globalisation; the return of geopolitics; and a shattering of the binding forces of interdependency. International trade and investment policy is increasingly seen in terms of national security rather than economic efficiency and prosperity, and all too often viewed as a coercive tool.
China believes that the current regional order is US-made in support of American interests. And as China has become richer, it has become more nationalist and ambitious around issues such as the South China Sea, Taiwan and its border with India. It has also created elements of an alternative regional order through initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Belt and Road Initiative.
For its part, the long-term US strategy has been to oppose the rise of a hostile dominant power in Asia. But US efforts to contain China have been relatively ineffectual. They have included president Barack Obama’s pivot to Asia; President Donald Trump’s trade wars; and efforts that aim encourage burden sharing among partners, such as AUKUS. Even today, it’s still not clear what the Trump administration’s posture is towards Asia.
Both countries are turning their backs on the US-led world order. Bisley explores three scenarios – where Asia’s future is fractured, unified or rebalanced – to understand the choices that will define not only Asia’s destiny, but the world’s. But Bisley’s pessimism shines through when he concludes that ‘Asia is a place that is bound to experience military competition, that will be subject to the vicissitudes of nationalism and ambition … it must find a way to ensure those forces do not spiral out of control’.
Asia’s modern resurgence is one of the greatest stories of our era and builds upon an extraordinary arc of history, according to Bisley, a pro vice-chancellor at Australia’s La Trobe University. Just 200 years ago, Asia was dominated by old empires, notably the Qing and Mughal, while Southeast Asia was populated by a range of sultanates, city states and other polities.
A hundred years later, Asia was substantially overrun by Western countries, notably Britain, the Netherlands, France and the United States. China was crumbling as European colonies dotted its seaboard, while Japan’s invasion was penetrating deeper into the country.
With the end of World War II, the idea of empires became anachronistic. The results were decolonisation and the formation of a region of independent states, driven by nationalism. But the borders are mainly colonial artifacts. New states were created, including Indonesia and Malaysia. Issues such as Taiwan and the two Koreas remain unresolved.
Bisley insists that Asia’s Cold War, the period from 1945–79, is really a misnomer, as this was a hot period of conflict and turmoil. At the same time, the Cold War saw the beginning of Asia’s economic acceleration, which started with the rise of Japan followed by Taiwan, South Korea and some Southeast Asian economies.
The normalisation of Sino-American relations in the 1970s boosted the Asian economy, as did China’s economic reform program. A dynamic Asian economy emerged, driven by globalisation, market integration and the development of global value chains, increasingly centred on China. Asia’s rise dwarfed previous historical developments, including the Industrial Revolution.
US regional security assurance complemented these economic factors. At the time, countries such as China may not have liked American primacy but swallowed it because it allowed Asian powers to concentrate on economic development. It is also clear that farsighted leaders such as China’s Deng Xiaoping and US president Bill Clinton made major contributions – something that Bisley could have emphasised more strongly.
But globalisation and market integration, which made China the world’s biggest economy in purchasing-power parity terms today, contained the seeds of their own destruction, according to Bisley. Financial crises emanating from the US and Europe raised questions about globalisation. And in September 2010, a stoush between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands led China to implement a rare-earths export ban, which highlighted how globalisation could be weaponised.
But while nationalism and geopolitics were beginning to surface before 2020, Bisley argues that Covid-19 pandemic was a key tipping point in the geopolitical competition. There was a lack of transparency about the origins of the virus. Supply chains for crucial supplies such as pharmaceuticals and personal protective equipment were weaponised. International cooperation was limited.
Bisley argues that today’s world is characterised by a broken consensus on the importance of globalisation; the return of geopolitics; and a shattering of the binding forces of interdependency. International trade and investment policy is increasingly seen in terms of national security rather than economic efficiency and prosperity, and all too often viewed as a coercive tool.
China believes that the current regional order is US-made in support of American interests. And as China has become richer, it has become more nationalist and ambitious around issues such as the South China Sea, Taiwan and its border with India. It has also created elements of an alternative regional order through initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Belt and Road Initiative.
For its part, the long-term US strategy has been to oppose the rise of a hostile dominant power in Asia. But US efforts to contain China have been relatively ineffectual. They have included president Barack Obama’s pivot to Asia; President Donald Trump’s trade wars; and efforts that aim encourage burden sharing among partners, such as AUKUS. Even today, it’s still not clear what the Trump administration’s posture is towards Asia.
Both countries are turning their backs on the US-led world order. Bisley explores three scenarios – where Asia’s future is fractured, unified or rebalanced – to understand the choices that will define not only Asia’s destiny, but the world’s. But Bisley’s pessimism shines through when he concludes that ‘Asia is a place that is bound to experience military competition, that will be subject to the vicissitudes of nationalism and ambition … it must find a way to ensure those forces do not spiral out of control’.