ASIA
25 November 2025
A World Disrupted by Bryce Wakefield
Bryce Wakefield’s opening speech for the 2025 National Conference of the Australian Institute for International Affairs.
On 17 November, the Australian Institute for International Affairs held its 2025 National Conference. AIIA CEO Dr Bryce Wakefield delivered the opening speech to the conference. What follows are some key extracts from the speech
The global systems upon which Australia’s security and prosperity depend are under strain… But this year–this year feels different.
The arrival of a second Trump administration has ushered in a set of dynamics that are more pointed, more chaotic, and more consequential than before.
At the same time, the administration’s embrace—both domestically and internationally—of what can only be described as a politics of grievance is reshaping conversations about alliances, values, and responsibilities.
Most imaginings of the future assume a world that is smaller, harder, bleaker … And yet—there are voices who see not only peril, but possibility.
… U.S.-based scholar Amitav Acharya, who suggests that a more multipolar, more fragmented system is not inherently negative—particularly for middle and smaller powers. He reminds us that smaller states have always contributed to the construction of global norms and rules.
Similarly, Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan argues that Southeast Asian nations are well accustomed to dealing with an America that is sometimes unreliable. For him, Trump does not represent chaos, but what might be called an “overt continuity of unreliability”...
There is also an alternate view—one less optimistic about global order but perhaps more sanguine from a narrowly national perspective.
This view suggests that while the erosion of order is damaging globally, Australia might, in fact, ride out the disruption reasonably well … Donald Trump does not spend much time thinking about Australia. That reality—however one interprets it—does leave space for the dense network of mechanisms, bureaucratic relationships, military cooperation platforms, and people-to-people ties that make up the Australia–U.S. alliance to continue functioning beneath the political surface.
And of course China remains a central factor. US–China competition continues to harden, yet China’s own relationships, economic headwinds, and ambitions are also shifting. What emerges from this will profoundly shape the contours of any new order. For Australia, managing this complex triangle—our largest trading partner, our principal strategic ally, and our own national interests—will remain one of the defining tasks of our foreign policy.
Order is not only the absence of chaos. It is the presence of predictability, institutions, norms, and—crucially—trust. For seven decades, Australia benefited profoundly from a system largely built and underwritten by the United States.
But the emerging landscape will not look like the post-war order.
We are in a phase where the foundations themselves are unsettled. We are not merely adjusting to new rules; we are watching the rules being rewritten.
The world is being reordered. The question for us is not whether this will happen—but how we choose to engage.
The global systems upon which Australia’s security and prosperity depend are under strain… But this year–this year feels different.
The arrival of a second Trump administration has ushered in a set of dynamics that are more pointed, more chaotic, and more consequential than before.
At the same time, the administration’s embrace—both domestically and internationally—of what can only be described as a politics of grievance is reshaping conversations about alliances, values, and responsibilities.
Most imaginings of the future assume a world that is smaller, harder, bleaker … And yet—there are voices who see not only peril, but possibility.
… U.S.-based scholar Amitav Acharya, who suggests that a more multipolar, more fragmented system is not inherently negative—particularly for middle and smaller powers. He reminds us that smaller states have always contributed to the construction of global norms and rules.
Similarly, Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan argues that Southeast Asian nations are well accustomed to dealing with an America that is sometimes unreliable. For him, Trump does not represent chaos, but what might be called an “overt continuity of unreliability”...
There is also an alternate view—one less optimistic about global order but perhaps more sanguine from a narrowly national perspective.
This view suggests that while the erosion of order is damaging globally, Australia might, in fact, ride out the disruption reasonably well … Donald Trump does not spend much time thinking about Australia. That reality—however one interprets it—does leave space for the dense network of mechanisms, bureaucratic relationships, military cooperation platforms, and people-to-people ties that make up the Australia–U.S. alliance to continue functioning beneath the political surface.
And of course China remains a central factor. US–China competition continues to harden, yet China’s own relationships, economic headwinds, and ambitions are also shifting. What emerges from this will profoundly shape the contours of any new order. For Australia, managing this complex triangle—our largest trading partner, our principal strategic ally, and our own national interests—will remain one of the defining tasks of our foreign policy.
Order is not only the absence of chaos. It is the presence of predictability, institutions, norms, and—crucially—trust. For seven decades, Australia benefited profoundly from a system largely built and underwritten by the United States.
But the emerging landscape will not look like the post-war order.
We are in a phase where the foundations themselves are unsettled. We are not merely adjusting to new rules; we are watching the rules being rewritten.
The world is being reordered. The question for us is not whether this will happen—but how we choose to engage.