ASIA
02 September 2025

Zbigniew Brzezinski's wisdom
One can only feel despair that people of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s caliber are not leading US foreign policy today.
I recently read Edward Luce’s excellent biography of Zbigniew Brzezinski
– Zbig: The Life of Zbigniew Brzezinski, America's Cold War Prophet – which details his extraordinary life. (Please do yourself a favour and read it!)
With his family, as a child Brzezinski left his home in Poland for Canada on the eve of World War 2. He studied at Harvard, became a professor at New York’s Columbia University, and was then actively involved in US politics. The pinnacle of his career was as President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor from 1977-81.
Following his position with Carter, Brzezinski did not set up a lucrative consulting business as did his counterpart, Henry Kissinger. He was however frequently called upon for advice, and he wrote a wonderful series of books on international relations. His books reflect inter alia his real sense of the fragility of societies. Unlike Kissinger, Brzezinski’s books are not gigantic doorstoppers. In 200 or so pages of crisp and succinct prose he was able to present a tight, well-documented argument.
Brzezinski argues persuasively that the West (US and Europe) is in desperate need for renewed “strategic vision” in response to dramatic changes in the world. He regards the West as the most vital part of the world in light of its core ideas regarding the relationship of the human being to society and government, and the rule of law. But he laments that the West seems unable to deal with many problems it faces because of a lack of a shared larger sense of direction.
For his part, Brzezinski saw the risk of a backlash from resentful countries, like Russia, China and Iran. Further, he argues that during this post Cold War period the US failed to take advantage of opportunity responsibly. Indeed, many opportunities were wasted as political problems such as in the Middle East were not solved and the economy was hit by financial crises and anti-globalisation sentiments.
Further, following the Soviet Union withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989, marking the end of the Soviet/Afghan war, the US turned a blind eye to Afghanistan, enabling the Taliban to take over Afghanistan. The Taliban were then complicit in the 9/11 attacks because they provided a safe haven for Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan.
Brzezinski argues that it is now highly unlikely that any one power will dominate the world. Global power has become more diffused with the rise of Asia. This means that the global mosaic is now much more contentious.
Politics then gradually spread throughout the world due to the role of education, urbanisation and the media, like the role of pamphlets in the 19th century. The process was enhanced both by the world wars. And after that by new technologies – radio, television, Internet and social media. Today, lots of the world’s population in the Global South are politically activated. And many are resentful, they have an anti-Western historical narrative, focusing on Western imperialism and colonialism. The global political awakening makes it difficult to imagine today a world order dominated by one country.
The second part of the book deals with the waning of the American dream. This country which was the inspiration for the world succumbed to megalomania and adventurism. The “long Imperial Wars” of the previous 20 years were a drain on US treasure and lives. Politicians like George W. Bush, who claimed that the US was "chosen by God" and commanded by history to be the dominant world hegemon only diminished the US in the eyes of the rest of the world.
This reaction is only reinforced by America’s host of financial, economic, social and infrastructure problems. Brzezinski fears that America’s governance may be facing the same kind of systemic paralysis that the Soviet Union faced in the 1980s with a well known result.
Brzezinski concludes that we will not be able to address the increasingly important global problems that threaten humanity if the world is dominated more and more by turmoil, demagogic and conflict. He argues that America should be the active promoter and sponsor of a “larger, more vital West”. That means not only the sharing of common purposes with Europeans with whom the US has bonds of history and values. He argues that we should seek to expand the scope of the West by reaching out and drawing in Turkey and Russia (although we will have to await the end of the Putin regime).
He insists that the US has to be engaged in Asia because it is a Pacific power as well as an Atlantic one. But the experience of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars suggest that the US must not get involved in Asian conflicts. The US role in Asia should be like that of the UK in 19th century Europe – the balancer, manipulator and conciliator. A genuinely cooperative relationship with China is necessary because both would lose if they get into conflict. The US should be promoting Japanese/Chinese reconciliation, mediating Indian/Chinese hostility, and contributing to more stability in Asia so it doesn't replicate the experience of 20th century Europe.
– Zbig: The Life of Zbigniew Brzezinski, America's Cold War Prophet – which details his extraordinary life. (Please do yourself a favour and read it!)
With his family, as a child Brzezinski left his home in Poland for Canada on the eve of World War 2. He studied at Harvard, became a professor at New York’s Columbia University, and was then actively involved in US politics. The pinnacle of his career was as President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor from 1977-81.
Following his position with Carter, Brzezinski did not set up a lucrative consulting business as did his counterpart, Henry Kissinger. He was however frequently called upon for advice, and he wrote a wonderful series of books on international relations. His books reflect inter alia his real sense of the fragility of societies. Unlike Kissinger, Brzezinski’s books are not gigantic doorstoppers. In 200 or so pages of crisp and succinct prose he was able to present a tight, well-documented argument.
The case for strategic vision
In 2012, at the ripe old age of 84, Brzezinski wrote his final book, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power. He would sadly pass away in 2017, a few months into Trump 1.0. Reading through this book, one can only feel despair that people of Brzezinski’s caliber are not leading US foreign policy today (according to Luce, there would be only four great geopolitical strategists in postwar America – Henry Kissinger, George Kennan, Dean Acheson and Brzezinski) . Moreover, there is still much wisdom in the 224 pages of this volume that is relevant to the world today.Brzezinski argues persuasively that the West (US and Europe) is in desperate need for renewed “strategic vision” in response to dramatic changes in the world. He regards the West as the most vital part of the world in light of its core ideas regarding the relationship of the human being to society and government, and the rule of law. But he laments that the West seems unable to deal with many problems it faces because of a lack of a shared larger sense of direction.
Changing nature of global power
The first section of the book deals with the changing nature of global power. In 1990, at the end of the Cold War, the US became the unique global superpower. But too many Americans were triumphalist and suffered from hubris (Brzezinski also regretted American triumphalism at the end of World War 2 – while Hitler’s Nazis were beaten, Stalin’s Soviet Union was one of the victors). Brzezinski insists that there is no such thing as an “end of history”. As Kissinger said, “I think what we don't understand so well in America is that history never stops. It goes on and on and on."For his part, Brzezinski saw the risk of a backlash from resentful countries, like Russia, China and Iran. Further, he argues that during this post Cold War period the US failed to take advantage of opportunity responsibly. Indeed, many opportunities were wasted as political problems such as in the Middle East were not solved and the economy was hit by financial crises and anti-globalisation sentiments.
Further, following the Soviet Union withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989, marking the end of the Soviet/Afghan war, the US turned a blind eye to Afghanistan, enabling the Taliban to take over Afghanistan. The Taliban were then complicit in the 9/11 attacks because they provided a safe haven for Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan.
Brzezinski argues that it is now highly unlikely that any one power will dominate the world. Global power has become more diffused with the rise of Asia. This means that the global mosaic is now much more contentious.
Global political awakening
Another point that Brzezinski emphasises is a “global political awakening”. Over the course of the last two centuries progressively all of humanity has become “politically conscious”. That was not the case prior to the French Revolution when most people lived in villages and farms with little sense of the outside world. It was an apolitical world. Politics at that time was something that mainly involved the top elites.Politics then gradually spread throughout the world due to the role of education, urbanisation and the media, like the role of pamphlets in the 19th century. The process was enhanced both by the world wars. And after that by new technologies – radio, television, Internet and social media. Today, lots of the world’s population in the Global South are politically activated. And many are resentful, they have an anti-Western historical narrative, focusing on Western imperialism and colonialism. The global political awakening makes it difficult to imagine today a world order dominated by one country.
The second part of the book deals with the waning of the American dream. This country which was the inspiration for the world succumbed to megalomania and adventurism. The “long Imperial Wars” of the previous 20 years were a drain on US treasure and lives. Politicians like George W. Bush, who claimed that the US was "chosen by God" and commanded by history to be the dominant world hegemon only diminished the US in the eyes of the rest of the world.
This reaction is only reinforced by America’s host of financial, economic, social and infrastructure problems. Brzezinski fears that America’s governance may be facing the same kind of systemic paralysis that the Soviet Union faced in the 1980s with a well known result.
Our chaotic future
Brzezinski writes that the world after 2025 will not be Chinese. Chaos will be the dominant global condition. So the danger we face is not another super power and hegemony, but rather more and more turmoil. This will be inimical to the preservation of Western values. The risk is that society could become increasingly prone to demagogy and extremism, viewing the world in Manichean, bifurcated terms. This danger is inherent domestically in America given the country’s poor education system, its difficulty in understanding these very complex global processes, and the tendency of the elite to reach out for simplistic solutions for complex problems. Another factor is that America’s foreign policy now suffers from partisan politics, with deep strategic analysis overlooked.Brzezinski concludes that we will not be able to address the increasingly important global problems that threaten humanity if the world is dominated more and more by turmoil, demagogic and conflict. He argues that America should be the active promoter and sponsor of a “larger, more vital West”. That means not only the sharing of common purposes with Europeans with whom the US has bonds of history and values. He argues that we should seek to expand the scope of the West by reaching out and drawing in Turkey and Russia (although we will have to await the end of the Putin regime).
He insists that the US has to be engaged in Asia because it is a Pacific power as well as an Atlantic one. But the experience of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars suggest that the US must not get involved in Asian conflicts. The US role in Asia should be like that of the UK in 19th century Europe – the balancer, manipulator and conciliator. A genuinely cooperative relationship with China is necessary because both would lose if they get into conflict. The US should be promoting Japanese/Chinese reconciliation, mediating Indian/Chinese hostility, and contributing to more stability in Asia so it doesn't replicate the experience of 20th century Europe.