ASEAN
15 February 2025
Suharto’s Cold War
Suharto's Cold War was a major turning point in modern history.
The murder of six of Indonesia’s most senior army leaders on 1 October 1965 by elements of the country’s communist party became a major turning point in Indonesia’s modern history. It would bring to an end the first phase of Indonesia’s independence, under President Sukarno, the leader of Indonesia’s struggle for independence from the Netherlands.
In the ensuing turmoil, General Suharto was able to take control of the military, ultimately edging Sukarno out of the presidency and becoming the second and longest serving president of Indonesia. Under Suharto’s leadership, the military and related organisations orchestrated a ‘politicide’ in which at least half a million leftists were killed.
In a recent book, Suharto’s Cold War: Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and the World, Mattias Fibiger takes us through subsequent events, as Suharto works to consolidate his regime and ensure that communism would never again take hold in the Indonesian archipelago. Fibiger, a professor at Harvard Business School, is the first scholar to offer a work of Indonesian history based on the central archival records of the Suharto regime.
A key theme of Fibiger’s narrative is the pivotal role of international capital in the global Cold War against communism. As part of his New Order policy, Suharto pursued international economic expertise and influence to rebuild the Indonesian economy and consolidate his power.
In the immediate aftermath of the murder of the generals, Suharto pushed Japan to halt economic aid to the Sukarno regime. This exacerbated Indonesia’s economic crisis, driving social unrest and helping bring to an end the Sukarno presidency.
Suharto then mobilised international aid from donors such as the United States, Japan, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. They shared a keen interest in supporting Suharto’s anti-communist regime. Thus, the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia was created, grouping donor countries to coordinate foreign aid to Indonesia and provide strong international support for economic recovery. Most importantly, although anti-communist, Suharto was no democrat. He was staunchly authoritarian.
To rebuild the economy, Suharto attracted international private investors to Indonesia’s rich natural resources, especially logging and mining. This enabled him to consolidate his anti-communist coalition by fending off internal opponents.
After the inauguration of a military aid relationship with the US, Suharto was able to buy the loyalty of the navy, a branch of the military that was loyal to Sukarno and had close links to Moscow.
While Cold War capital supported his authoritarian regime, Suharto would gain some independence with the rise in oil prices in the 1970s.
Suharto’s furthered his anti-communist campaign in Southeast Asia, working to ensure that Indonesia’s neighbours were governed by anti-communist governments and Chinese influence was contained.
For example, Indonesia joined forces with Malaysia to combat a communist insurgency on the island of Borneo where they share a border. And Suharto worked with President Marcos of the Philippines against the Moro secessionist movement.
Fibiger also argues that Suharto tried to remake Southeast Asia in Indonesia’s image by propagandising Indonesia’s national resilience doctrine. It promotes maintaining a strong, integrated system across all aspects of national life. Thus, when other Southeast Asian elites faced moments of political crisis, they would draw on this ideology.
Today, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—a political and economic union of 10 states —that plays a major role in regional and global governance. But its creation in 1967—then counting just five members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand—was initially motivated by Indonesia’s desire to contain communism.
Suharto’s anti-communist campaign in Indonesia and further afield in Southeast Asia was an important phase in the global Cold War. Fibiger’s book provides fascinating insights into this period of history, including the ever-present encouraging hands of the US, Britain, Japan and Australia—although it is never clear what was the motivation for Suharto’s anti-communist tilt.
Much has also happened in Indonesia since these times. In the beginning of the 1980s, Indonesia’s domestic Cold War ended as political Islam was perceived as a greater regime threat than communism, according to Fibiger. Then followed the Asian financial crisis, the end of the Suharto regime, and democratisation.
But Indonesia remains a good partner of the West, even though it carefully avoids taking sides in the current great power rivalry. We can only regret that in recent years the US has had difficulty finding much time to invest in this important friendship—something which will likely get worse with the changes in Washington.
In the ensuing turmoil, General Suharto was able to take control of the military, ultimately edging Sukarno out of the presidency and becoming the second and longest serving president of Indonesia. Under Suharto’s leadership, the military and related organisations orchestrated a ‘politicide’ in which at least half a million leftists were killed.
In a recent book, Suharto’s Cold War: Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and the World, Mattias Fibiger takes us through subsequent events, as Suharto works to consolidate his regime and ensure that communism would never again take hold in the Indonesian archipelago. Fibiger, a professor at Harvard Business School, is the first scholar to offer a work of Indonesian history based on the central archival records of the Suharto regime.
A key theme of Fibiger’s narrative is the pivotal role of international capital in the global Cold War against communism. As part of his New Order policy, Suharto pursued international economic expertise and influence to rebuild the Indonesian economy and consolidate his power.
In the immediate aftermath of the murder of the generals, Suharto pushed Japan to halt economic aid to the Sukarno regime. This exacerbated Indonesia’s economic crisis, driving social unrest and helping bring to an end the Sukarno presidency.
Suharto then mobilised international aid from donors such as the United States, Japan, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. They shared a keen interest in supporting Suharto’s anti-communist regime. Thus, the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia was created, grouping donor countries to coordinate foreign aid to Indonesia and provide strong international support for economic recovery. Most importantly, although anti-communist, Suharto was no democrat. He was staunchly authoritarian.
To rebuild the economy, Suharto attracted international private investors to Indonesia’s rich natural resources, especially logging and mining. This enabled him to consolidate his anti-communist coalition by fending off internal opponents.
After the inauguration of a military aid relationship with the US, Suharto was able to buy the loyalty of the navy, a branch of the military that was loyal to Sukarno and had close links to Moscow.
While Cold War capital supported his authoritarian regime, Suharto would gain some independence with the rise in oil prices in the 1970s.
Suharto’s furthered his anti-communist campaign in Southeast Asia, working to ensure that Indonesia’s neighbours were governed by anti-communist governments and Chinese influence was contained.
For example, Indonesia joined forces with Malaysia to combat a communist insurgency on the island of Borneo where they share a border. And Suharto worked with President Marcos of the Philippines against the Moro secessionist movement.
Fibiger also argues that Suharto tried to remake Southeast Asia in Indonesia’s image by propagandising Indonesia’s national resilience doctrine. It promotes maintaining a strong, integrated system across all aspects of national life. Thus, when other Southeast Asian elites faced moments of political crisis, they would draw on this ideology.
Today, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—a political and economic union of 10 states —that plays a major role in regional and global governance. But its creation in 1967—then counting just five members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand—was initially motivated by Indonesia’s desire to contain communism.
Suharto’s anti-communist campaign in Indonesia and further afield in Southeast Asia was an important phase in the global Cold War. Fibiger’s book provides fascinating insights into this period of history, including the ever-present encouraging hands of the US, Britain, Japan and Australia—although it is never clear what was the motivation for Suharto’s anti-communist tilt.
Much has also happened in Indonesia since these times. In the beginning of the 1980s, Indonesia’s domestic Cold War ended as political Islam was perceived as a greater regime threat than communism, according to Fibiger. Then followed the Asian financial crisis, the end of the Suharto regime, and democratisation.
But Indonesia remains a good partner of the West, even though it carefully avoids taking sides in the current great power rivalry. We can only regret that in recent years the US has had difficulty finding much time to invest in this important friendship—something which will likely get worse with the changes in Washington.