ASIA
03 February 2025
America’s Alliance System in Asia
America’s Alliance System in Asia is a greatly underappreciated asset of the US.
America’s Alliance System in Asia has always been a great asset of the US. And while the international context in East Asia has changed substantially, the Alliance System remains of great value, despite criticism by Donald Trump and his followers.
Today, however, there are many voices in Washington who question the value of these alliances, accusing these US allies of free-riding on the US. As highlighted in a book by American political scientist Victor D. Cha, which focuses on the cases of South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, many of these critical voices overlook the historical circumstances in which these alliances were created, and their ongoing relevance in the new Cold War.
The Korean War (1950-53) announced the beginning of the Cold War in Asia. The “domino theory” was in vogue. This was a Cold War view that a communist government in one nation would quickly lead to communist takeovers in neighboring states, each falling like a row of dominos.
Thus the US was keen to develop allies with strong anti-communist credentials. And as Cha argues, South Korea and Taiwan were obvious candidates (at that time, the US had diplomatic relations with Taiwan, rather than the mainland). But they were not perfect candidates. The countries were governed by authoritarian regimes, not democracies, meaning that the regimes had questionable domestic legitimacy.
Moreover, following the Korean and Chinese Civil Wars, both countries had leaders with revisionist intentions, who wanted to change the political status quo of their countries. Taiwan’s Chiang Kai-shek wanted to retake mainland China and Syngman Rhee wanted to unify the Korean peninsula under his rule.
Most importantly, the US decided on a different security model in Asia than in Europe where a multilateral political and security alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), was established. (The system of bilateral alliances in Asia is often referred to as a “hub-and-spokes” system, with the US being the hub and its Asian allies being spokes.) Having bilateral alliances with Taiwan and South Korea made it easier for the US to control each country.
Interestingly, today China is widely criticised for using such a bilateral approach in its relations with its Asian neighbours, notably for discussions for a possible code of conduct for the South China Sea. In relationships between large and smaller countries (“power imbalances”), the large country can invariably insist on bilateral relationships, rather than multilateral ones which smaller countries would prefer.
There were also other benefits of the Alliance System, especially as they enabled the US to establish military bases inside the allies, which could be used for multiple purposes, and which continue to this day in South Korea and Japan. Most importantly, the Alliance System includes cost sharing agreements, such that US allies contributed to Alliance costs.
In the immediate postwar period, Japan was essentially occupied by the US, with Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander from 1945-51. Initially, the emphasis of the Occupation policy was on the emasculation and democratisation of Japan. But this would change with the “Reverse Course” beginning in 1947, which focused on strengthening, not punishing Japan so that it would become a key Cold War ally of the US.
At the time, leading Cold Warrior George Kenan and others believed that Japan was the only prospective great power in Asia. Thus, the US wanted to control the recovery and reintegration of Japan into the postwar order, especially since there was little regional trust in Japan at the time. The goal was for Japan to become the Great Britain of Asia. One unfortunate consequence of Japan being involved in a bilateral alliance, rather than a multilateral alliance with its Asian neighbours, was that Japan was never faced with the imperative of reconciliation with its neighbours, in contrast to the case of Germany.
The US also played a major role in these countries’ democratic development. After establishing a democratic regime in Japan, the US provided great support to Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, which has enabled it to dominate Japanese politics right through to the present day. And more than a nudge from the US facilitated the democratic transitions in South Korea and Taiwan during the 1980s and 1990s. Democracy also likely contributed to peace as democracies are less prone to military adventurism.
Today, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea would all be “full democracies”, ranked 10th, 16th and 22nd in the world, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s survey of 167 jurisdictions (this study was completed before the current political turmoil in South Korea). Indeed, these three jurisdictions are ahead of the 28th ranking of the US, which is also classed as a “flawed democracy”.
Further, it is expected that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means and that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means are of grave concern to the United States. Moreover, the US committed to make available to Taiwan defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capacity. Most importantly, the US government has maintained a policy of “strategic ambiguity” meaning that it does not reveal how it would react in the event of a conflict between China and Taiwan. It believes that this is the best way to deter military conflict across the Taiwan Straits.
Following the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/98, a number of new initiatives have been launched driven by the ASEAN countries of Southeast Asia, like the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN+3 fora, the Chiang Mai Initiative, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. More recently, China has driven other initiatives, notably the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia. China has also sought to delegitimise the US Alliance System by criticising the exclusive bilateral alliances, even calling them a “Cold War dinosaur”. .
At the same time, America’s Alliance System has also evolved flexibly as some “spokes” of the hub-and-spokes system are now connecting, such as the US–Japanese–Korean trilateral pact, US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Maritime Dialogue, the US-Australia-Japan trilateral strategic dialogue, and Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the US.
Thus, the Alliance System is providing a means for American Allies to contribute to the balancing of the rise of China – something which is all the more necessary as China, rather than the US, is now their main economic partner. Further, both Japan, and Australia (notably through AUKUS) have also committed to increase defence expenditures as a contribution to maintaining the rules-based world order that has underpinned world prosperity and relative peace over the past 80 years. Most regrettably, one major shortcoming in America’s relationship with Asia today is its absence from Asia’s trade agreements, namely, The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
Perhaps one of the greatest problems facing the US today is the inability of Donald Trump and his followers to appreciate and understand the continuing great benefits that America’s Alliance System in Asia can offer the country. This has led to a decline in Allies’ trust in the reliability of the US, which is only weakening the benefits of the Asian Alliances to the US.
Cold War origins
During the early days of the Cold War (which lasted from 1947 to 1991), the US established security alliances with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand. (The US also has a close security partnership with Singapore.) According to these alliances, the US should provide these allies with assistance in the case of a military conflict.Today, however, there are many voices in Washington who question the value of these alliances, accusing these US allies of free-riding on the US. As highlighted in a book by American political scientist Victor D. Cha, which focuses on the cases of South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, many of these critical voices overlook the historical circumstances in which these alliances were created, and their ongoing relevance in the new Cold War.
The Korean War (1950-53) announced the beginning of the Cold War in Asia. The “domino theory” was in vogue. This was a Cold War view that a communist government in one nation would quickly lead to communist takeovers in neighboring states, each falling like a row of dominos.
Thus the US was keen to develop allies with strong anti-communist credentials. And as Cha argues, South Korea and Taiwan were obvious candidates (at that time, the US had diplomatic relations with Taiwan, rather than the mainland). But they were not perfect candidates. The countries were governed by authoritarian regimes, not democracies, meaning that the regimes had questionable domestic legitimacy.
Moreover, following the Korean and Chinese Civil Wars, both countries had leaders with revisionist intentions, who wanted to change the political status quo of their countries. Taiwan’s Chiang Kai-shek wanted to retake mainland China and Syngman Rhee wanted to unify the Korean peninsula under his rule.
No Asian NATO
So the US used bilateral security alliances as a way of supporting these anti-communist allies, but also a way of controlling them and preventing them from acquiring nuclear weapons. The US would routinely threaten to withdraw the benefits of the security alliance, at the slightest hint of either Chiang or Rhee attacking mainland China or North Korea. The last thing the US wanted was to get entrapped in another war in Asia. Europe was the US security priority. Indeed, during the 1950s, Europe was convinced that Europe was destined for another war, with the Soviet Union.Most importantly, the US decided on a different security model in Asia than in Europe where a multilateral political and security alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), was established. (The system of bilateral alliances in Asia is often referred to as a “hub-and-spokes” system, with the US being the hub and its Asian allies being spokes.) Having bilateral alliances with Taiwan and South Korea made it easier for the US to control each country.
Interestingly, today China is widely criticised for using such a bilateral approach in its relations with its Asian neighbours, notably for discussions for a possible code of conduct for the South China Sea. In relationships between large and smaller countries (“power imbalances”), the large country can invariably insist on bilateral relationships, rather than multilateral ones which smaller countries would prefer.
There were also other benefits of the Alliance System, especially as they enabled the US to establish military bases inside the allies, which could be used for multiple purposes, and which continue to this day in South Korea and Japan. Most importantly, the Alliance System includes cost sharing agreements, such that US allies contributed to Alliance costs.
US alliance with Japan
Japan is another case where the US established a bilateral security alliance. But the circumstances were different. No-one feared that Japan would drag the US into a military conflict. But the US also wanted to use an alliance for political control of Japan.In the immediate postwar period, Japan was essentially occupied by the US, with Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander from 1945-51. Initially, the emphasis of the Occupation policy was on the emasculation and democratisation of Japan. But this would change with the “Reverse Course” beginning in 1947, which focused on strengthening, not punishing Japan so that it would become a key Cold War ally of the US.
At the time, leading Cold Warrior George Kenan and others believed that Japan was the only prospective great power in Asia. Thus, the US wanted to control the recovery and reintegration of Japan into the postwar order, especially since there was little regional trust in Japan at the time. The goal was for Japan to become the Great Britain of Asia. One unfortunate consequence of Japan being involved in a bilateral alliance, rather than a multilateral alliance with its Asian neighbours, was that Japan was never faced with the imperative of reconciliation with its neighbours, in contrast to the case of Germany.
Alliances plant seeds for an Asian Century
As Cha argues, there was a lot more to these alliances. The US provided much support for the rebuilding of the countries’ post war economies. Open access to the US market also meant that the US became their major trading partner. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all enjoyed rapid economic growth. Although it was not a topic of speculation at the time, it is now obvious that the US planted the seeds of a possible Asian Century through its Alliance System in Asia.The US also played a major role in these countries’ democratic development. After establishing a democratic regime in Japan, the US provided great support to Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, which has enabled it to dominate Japanese politics right through to the present day. And more than a nudge from the US facilitated the democratic transitions in South Korea and Taiwan during the 1980s and 1990s. Democracy also likely contributed to peace as democracies are less prone to military adventurism.
Today, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea would all be “full democracies”, ranked 10th, 16th and 22nd in the world, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s survey of 167 jurisdictions (this study was completed before the current political turmoil in South Korea). Indeed, these three jurisdictions are ahead of the 28th ranking of the US, which is also classed as a “flawed democracy”.
The case of Taiwan
In 1979, the US switched diplomatic relations from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China (mainland China). But it has still kept a close watch over Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act of the same year. According to this legislation, the US preserves and promotes extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the peoples of the US and Taiwan.Further, it is expected that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means and that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means are of grave concern to the United States. Moreover, the US committed to make available to Taiwan defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capacity. Most importantly, the US government has maintained a policy of “strategic ambiguity” meaning that it does not reveal how it would react in the event of a conflict between China and Taiwan. It believes that this is the best way to deter military conflict across the Taiwan Straits.
Evolution of political and security cooperation in Asia
The world of today is very different from the time when America’s Alliance System was created for Asia. At that time, the Alliances were the main form of political and security cooperation across the Asia-Pacific.Following the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/98, a number of new initiatives have been launched driven by the ASEAN countries of Southeast Asia, like the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN+3 fora, the Chiang Mai Initiative, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. More recently, China has driven other initiatives, notably the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia. China has also sought to delegitimise the US Alliance System by criticising the exclusive bilateral alliances, even calling them a “Cold War dinosaur”. .
At the same time, America’s Alliance System has also evolved flexibly as some “spokes” of the hub-and-spokes system are now connecting, such as the US–Japanese–Korean trilateral pact, US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Maritime Dialogue, the US-Australia-Japan trilateral strategic dialogue, and Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the US.
Thus, the Alliance System is providing a means for American Allies to contribute to the balancing of the rise of China – something which is all the more necessary as China, rather than the US, is now their main economic partner. Further, both Japan, and Australia (notably through AUKUS) have also committed to increase defence expenditures as a contribution to maintaining the rules-based world order that has underpinned world prosperity and relative peace over the past 80 years. Most regrettably, one major shortcoming in America’s relationship with Asia today is its absence from Asia’s trade agreements, namely, The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
Conclusion
In conclusion, America’s Asian Alliances began as an outgrowth and manifestation of US power. But today they can complement and supplement US power in a context where US power and resources are less strong than before, and where there is a growing imperative to balance China’s rise. All things considered, the US Alliance system is still the most important in Asia, with the deepest imprint in Asia, while Asian organisations are an inefficient messy patchwork, often referred to as a “noodle-bowl” over regional cooperation.Perhaps one of the greatest problems facing the US today is the inability of Donald Trump and his followers to appreciate and understand the continuing great benefits that America’s Alliance System in Asia can offer the country. This has led to a decline in Allies’ trust in the reliability of the US, which is only weakening the benefits of the Asian Alliances to the US.