CHINA
12 July 2024
Lost Decade: The U.S. Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power
President Obama's Pivot to Asia was never implemented, with the result that the US now finds itself in a weaker position vis-a-vis China in Asia.
The Obama administration’s Pivot to Asia was the right idea at the right time, according to a new book by Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine. They argue, however, that the Pivot was never implemented, and the US now finds itself in a weaker position vis-a-vis China in Asia.
In 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the “Pivot to Asia” in US foreign policy, in an article in the US Foreign Policy magazine. This was then affirmed by President Barack Obama in a speech to the Australian Parliament on 17 November 2011. For the first time in US history, US foreign policy would be Asia-first rather than Europe-first.
But in their recent book, “Lost Decade: The U.S. Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power,” Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine argue that while the pivot was announced, it never actually happened–despite the compelling case for the Pivot in terms of ensuring strategic balance with China’s growing power and taking advantage of Asia’s economic dynamism. And while the US was failing to Pivot, China was moving closer to its Asian neighbours during this period–militarily, economically, and through its diplomacy. Indeed, China is now the leading trading partner for most Asian countries, leaving them more exposed to potential economic coercion.
Blackwill, of the US Council on Foreign Relations, and Fontaine, of the Center for a New American Security, conclude that the US was in a much weaker position in Asia by 2021 than in 2011, the period of the “Lost Decade” (which covers much of the Obama and Trump presidencies). Indeed, they argue that the failure to pivot was one of the three greatest US foreign policy mistakes since the end of World War II, the others being President Lyndon Johnson’s 1965 decision to escalate the war in Vietnam and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Moreover, during this period, the US revealed a weak sense of resolve by doing nothing when China built artificial islands in the South China Sea and then militarised them, against the solemn word of the Chinese president to the American president. The power of US deterrence was further weakened when two presidents drew red lines in the Middle East, and did not act when they were breached.
The authors explain the three pillars of the Pivot. First, it was envisaged that a winding down of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan would free up military resources for Asia. But the wars did not wind down. And the US defence budget was cut by US$500 billion through domestic budget processes, with the result that US military resources in Asia declined over the lost decade.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal was the key economic pillar. But delays in negotiations meant that it got caught up in the 2016 presidential campaign and was disowned by both candidates, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. The latter withdrew the US from the TPP following his inauguration. The TPP debacle was arguably the greatest failure of the Pivot. Last, US diplomacy in the region was inconsistent, with Secretary Clinton being very active, while her successor, John Kerry, was more involved in the Middle East and Russia. But perhaps most importantly there was no catalytic event to mobilise the country for such a change in grand strategy. Nor did the Pivot benefit from presidential discipline and determination to ensure its implementation.
The authors also tell a story of the mismanagement of an idea which ironically had bipartisan support. There was no serious “inter-agency” process in the US government for the preparation of Clinton’s article. This meant that much of the US government did not understand the Pivot or was able to respond to inevitable questions. Nor were America’s friends, partners, and allies affected by the Pivot consulted or warned. Europeans in particular did not react well to the possibility of the US pivoting away from them to Asia, while many Asian countries feared that the US was going to push them to choose between China and the US. In the flurry of reactions, the Pivot was renamed the “Rebalance.” While Rebalance was then used in official communications, the catchier term “Pivot” continued to be widely used.
The tragic irony of the Pivot was the reaction of China, the main target of the Pivot. China launched a rhetorical campaign against the Pivot even though it knew full well that the US was doing very little towards implementation. And China seized the occasion to undertake the astonishing growth of its military power, which shifted the balance of military power around the South China Sea and Taiwan.
The authors argue that the US persistently underestimated the China challenge until late in 2010s. It was not until President Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy that the notion of China becoming a “responsible stakeholder” in the world order was jettisoned, with China being labelled a “strategic competitor” and “revisionist power.” But Trump did little more than the Pivot; on the contrary he insulted key allies.
The efforts of the Biden administration to launch a new “partial Pivot” through a number of initiatives is very impressive. The AUKUS partnership between the US, UK, and Australia is important and will likely see a growing number of participants. The Quad meeting has been elevated to the summit level. And relations have been boosted with several Asian countries such as through the first ASEAN summit in Washington, the strengthening of the US Alliance with Japan, and partnerships like US/Japan/Korea and US/Japan/Philippines. In short, Biden recognises that the US can only compete with China with help from its allies, partners, and friends. But the attention of the Biden administration has been hijacked by events like the wars in Ukraine and Gaza.
The authors are very convincing in their case for a new Pivot to ensure that China is either unable or unwilling to overturn the rules-based international order. But they do not foster great optimism. They recommend increased military spending and concentration in Asia, when the reverse is actually happening. They call for a US trade policy for Asia when the US is not a party to either the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership or the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. A fundamental challenge facing US policymakers is that the American public is very sceptical about the country’s international role and leadership.
For people like this reader who lived through the “Lost Decade,” it will be a delight to read through this well documented and logically ordered narrative of the period’s events. There are of course commentators who quibble with details in the story. But the US’ weakened position in Asia is a reality, which is important to understand, especially as we prepare for the unforeseeable consequences of the upcoming US presidential elections. For these reasons, this book is a “must-read” for all interested in international relations.
In 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the “Pivot to Asia” in US foreign policy, in an article in the US Foreign Policy magazine. This was then affirmed by President Barack Obama in a speech to the Australian Parliament on 17 November 2011. For the first time in US history, US foreign policy would be Asia-first rather than Europe-first.
But in their recent book, “Lost Decade: The U.S. Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power,” Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine argue that while the pivot was announced, it never actually happened–despite the compelling case for the Pivot in terms of ensuring strategic balance with China’s growing power and taking advantage of Asia’s economic dynamism. And while the US was failing to Pivot, China was moving closer to its Asian neighbours during this period–militarily, economically, and through its diplomacy. Indeed, China is now the leading trading partner for most Asian countries, leaving them more exposed to potential economic coercion.
Blackwill, of the US Council on Foreign Relations, and Fontaine, of the Center for a New American Security, conclude that the US was in a much weaker position in Asia by 2021 than in 2011, the period of the “Lost Decade” (which covers much of the Obama and Trump presidencies). Indeed, they argue that the failure to pivot was one of the three greatest US foreign policy mistakes since the end of World War II, the others being President Lyndon Johnson’s 1965 decision to escalate the war in Vietnam and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Moreover, during this period, the US revealed a weak sense of resolve by doing nothing when China built artificial islands in the South China Sea and then militarised them, against the solemn word of the Chinese president to the American president. The power of US deterrence was further weakened when two presidents drew red lines in the Middle East, and did not act when they were breached.
The authors explain the three pillars of the Pivot. First, it was envisaged that a winding down of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan would free up military resources for Asia. But the wars did not wind down. And the US defence budget was cut by US$500 billion through domestic budget processes, with the result that US military resources in Asia declined over the lost decade.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal was the key economic pillar. But delays in negotiations meant that it got caught up in the 2016 presidential campaign and was disowned by both candidates, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. The latter withdrew the US from the TPP following his inauguration. The TPP debacle was arguably the greatest failure of the Pivot. Last, US diplomacy in the region was inconsistent, with Secretary Clinton being very active, while her successor, John Kerry, was more involved in the Middle East and Russia. But perhaps most importantly there was no catalytic event to mobilise the country for such a change in grand strategy. Nor did the Pivot benefit from presidential discipline and determination to ensure its implementation.
The authors also tell a story of the mismanagement of an idea which ironically had bipartisan support. There was no serious “inter-agency” process in the US government for the preparation of Clinton’s article. This meant that much of the US government did not understand the Pivot or was able to respond to inevitable questions. Nor were America’s friends, partners, and allies affected by the Pivot consulted or warned. Europeans in particular did not react well to the possibility of the US pivoting away from them to Asia, while many Asian countries feared that the US was going to push them to choose between China and the US. In the flurry of reactions, the Pivot was renamed the “Rebalance.” While Rebalance was then used in official communications, the catchier term “Pivot” continued to be widely used.
The tragic irony of the Pivot was the reaction of China, the main target of the Pivot. China launched a rhetorical campaign against the Pivot even though it knew full well that the US was doing very little towards implementation. And China seized the occasion to undertake the astonishing growth of its military power, which shifted the balance of military power around the South China Sea and Taiwan.
The authors argue that the US persistently underestimated the China challenge until late in 2010s. It was not until President Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy that the notion of China becoming a “responsible stakeholder” in the world order was jettisoned, with China being labelled a “strategic competitor” and “revisionist power.” But Trump did little more than the Pivot; on the contrary he insulted key allies.
The efforts of the Biden administration to launch a new “partial Pivot” through a number of initiatives is very impressive. The AUKUS partnership between the US, UK, and Australia is important and will likely see a growing number of participants. The Quad meeting has been elevated to the summit level. And relations have been boosted with several Asian countries such as through the first ASEAN summit in Washington, the strengthening of the US Alliance with Japan, and partnerships like US/Japan/Korea and US/Japan/Philippines. In short, Biden recognises that the US can only compete with China with help from its allies, partners, and friends. But the attention of the Biden administration has been hijacked by events like the wars in Ukraine and Gaza.
The authors are very convincing in their case for a new Pivot to ensure that China is either unable or unwilling to overturn the rules-based international order. But they do not foster great optimism. They recommend increased military spending and concentration in Asia, when the reverse is actually happening. They call for a US trade policy for Asia when the US is not a party to either the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership or the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. A fundamental challenge facing US policymakers is that the American public is very sceptical about the country’s international role and leadership.
For people like this reader who lived through the “Lost Decade,” it will be a delight to read through this well documented and logically ordered narrative of the period’s events. There are of course commentators who quibble with details in the story. But the US’ weakened position in Asia is a reality, which is important to understand, especially as we prepare for the unforeseeable consequences of the upcoming US presidential elections. For these reasons, this book is a “must-read” for all interested in international relations.
REFERENCES:
- John West. Book Review: Lost Decade: The U.S. Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power. Australian Institute of International Affairs. 12 July 2024- Hillary Clinton. America’s Pacific Century. Foreign Policy. 11 October 2011.
- Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament