ASIA
29 January 2024
Will the West Fall Like Rome?
Could the fall of Rome, provoked by unruly Barbarians, be a model for the possible fall of the West?
The geopolitical dominance and future of the “West” seem threatened. Commentators like Steve Bannon and Nigel Farage draw parallels with the fall of ancient Rome. Like Rome, a decadent and effete West would be threatened by new forces of chaos, new “barbarians”, in the form of waves of refugees and migrants, especially Muslim migrants.
But this perspective would be based on the outdated 18th century work of Edward Gibbon, according to a new book by political economist John Rapley and historian Peter Heather. More recent archeological work reveals that the Roman economy did not peak in the second century and begin a gradual decline. The Roman economy remained strong until the fourth century.
The authors argue that longlasting imperial systems, like ancient Rome and the West today, by the way they operate, tend to undermine their own continued existence by fostering economic and political development in the region around the empire. This argument would be more relevant in drawing parallels between ancient Rome and the West.
In this context, Rapley and Heather highlight three factors that undermined the Roman empire. First, Rome's European frontiers saw vast numbers of prosperous Germanic-speaking tribal units transformed into larger, more formidable confederations which shifted the power balance between Rome and its neighbours. Then Rome’s strategic position was also weakened on its Eastern frontier by the rise of Persia as a peer superpower in the 3rd century.
Another factor threatening the cohesion of ancient Rome was internal division within the Roman system. There were tensions between some regional aristocracies and the imperial centre. Moreover, from around the year 300 onwards, Rome had more than one ruler, two centres of political power, who would squabble and occasionally fight each other.
Rapley and Heather see the renaissance of dynamic Asian economies like China being a parallel to the creation of Germanic confederations and the rise of Persia. The West’s neoliberal economic policies and globalisation would have fostered Asia’s economic development, with the increase in economic power resulting in a rise in political power. The West’s political power is estimated to have peaked in the year 2000.
But while this means that the West is declining in relative terms, this does not imply a decline of the West in absolute terms. Indeed, even today, the Western economy is still growing. But the period of Western domination which began some 300 years ago is now past.
Calls by some for the West to attempt a return to a position of global dominance are unrealistic. The tectonic plates have shifted. The key challenge for the West is to adapt to the new reality that it no longer dominates the world, although it can remain a very important player in a reordered world.
The West may find the human rights policies and politics of China and other emerging economies offensive. But the rise of non-Western economies is a reality which must be dealt with, according to Rapley and Heather. And the terrible history of Western colonialism (notably the Opium Wars) means that the West should be modest and respectful of these emerging economies. Moreover, the West needs to have constructive working relationships with China and other emerging economies to tackle global issues like climate change and pandemics.
The authors argue that while Western prosperity is still growing, the rise of emerging economies is having distributional effects, as some groups in Western society are benefiting from the rise of emerging economies, while others (notably lower-skilled workers) are losing out. They also argue that the ageing populations, which actually afflict most countries worldwide, is the major challenge facing Western countries.
The book offers a nice read and an interesting story. But it is not entirely new or convincing. Realist international relations scholars like John Mearsheimer argue that the US created a rod for its own back in admitting China into the rules-based liberal world order and fostering its rise as a new great power. And he manages to make this argument without resorting to a parallel with ancient Rome.
Rapley and Heather’s supposed 300-year domination of the West seems to overlook the reality that the West has only been a coherent entity since the end of World War 2. It is plain wrong to suggest that the West is an empire comparable to ancient Rome. Several Western countries headed up their own empires, rather than being part of a Western empire, and competed with other Western countries in the quest for empire. Further, for much of this period the West was at war with itself. Even today, Europe struggles to maintain its unity on many issues, with Brexit being a sad example of European disunity.
And while China would be the equivalent of Rome’s Barbarians, the rise of China is only something which has occurred over the past few decades, and there are signs that the Chinese miracle could be fizzling out. The Chinese economy may stay large, meaning that it will remain a political power. But the greatest threat from China may come from instability generated by internal weaknesses, rather than its great power. So the analogy of the Rome/Barbarian analogy may not be the right one. Today, both the West and China have their troubles, and the future may be one of a troubled coexistence for the foreseeable future.
All that said, foreseeing the future is more imponderable than ever. Russia’s invasion has united the West more than it has been for a very long time. But there is a big question how long that unity can last, as the war in Gaza distracts and unsettles the West, and the spectre of a return of Donald Trump to the America presidency haunts the cohesion of the West.
In conclusion, Rapley and Heather’s book has an intriguing and thought-provoking hypothesis, and could still stimulate much brainstorming. But overall, its argument is interesting but not convincing.
But this perspective would be based on the outdated 18th century work of Edward Gibbon, according to a new book by political economist John Rapley and historian Peter Heather. More recent archeological work reveals that the Roman economy did not peak in the second century and begin a gradual decline. The Roman economy remained strong until the fourth century.
The authors argue that longlasting imperial systems, like ancient Rome and the West today, by the way they operate, tend to undermine their own continued existence by fostering economic and political development in the region around the empire. This argument would be more relevant in drawing parallels between ancient Rome and the West.
In this context, Rapley and Heather highlight three factors that undermined the Roman empire. First, Rome's European frontiers saw vast numbers of prosperous Germanic-speaking tribal units transformed into larger, more formidable confederations which shifted the power balance between Rome and its neighbours. Then Rome’s strategic position was also weakened on its Eastern frontier by the rise of Persia as a peer superpower in the 3rd century.
Another factor threatening the cohesion of ancient Rome was internal division within the Roman system. There were tensions between some regional aristocracies and the imperial centre. Moreover, from around the year 300 onwards, Rome had more than one ruler, two centres of political power, who would squabble and occasionally fight each other.
Rapley and Heather see the renaissance of dynamic Asian economies like China being a parallel to the creation of Germanic confederations and the rise of Persia. The West’s neoliberal economic policies and globalisation would have fostered Asia’s economic development, with the increase in economic power resulting in a rise in political power. The West’s political power is estimated to have peaked in the year 2000.
But while this means that the West is declining in relative terms, this does not imply a decline of the West in absolute terms. Indeed, even today, the Western economy is still growing. But the period of Western domination which began some 300 years ago is now past.
Calls by some for the West to attempt a return to a position of global dominance are unrealistic. The tectonic plates have shifted. The key challenge for the West is to adapt to the new reality that it no longer dominates the world, although it can remain a very important player in a reordered world.
The West may find the human rights policies and politics of China and other emerging economies offensive. But the rise of non-Western economies is a reality which must be dealt with, according to Rapley and Heather. And the terrible history of Western colonialism (notably the Opium Wars) means that the West should be modest and respectful of these emerging economies. Moreover, the West needs to have constructive working relationships with China and other emerging economies to tackle global issues like climate change and pandemics.
The authors argue that while Western prosperity is still growing, the rise of emerging economies is having distributional effects, as some groups in Western society are benefiting from the rise of emerging economies, while others (notably lower-skilled workers) are losing out. They also argue that the ageing populations, which actually afflict most countries worldwide, is the major challenge facing Western countries.
The book offers a nice read and an interesting story. But it is not entirely new or convincing. Realist international relations scholars like John Mearsheimer argue that the US created a rod for its own back in admitting China into the rules-based liberal world order and fostering its rise as a new great power. And he manages to make this argument without resorting to a parallel with ancient Rome.
Rapley and Heather’s supposed 300-year domination of the West seems to overlook the reality that the West has only been a coherent entity since the end of World War 2. It is plain wrong to suggest that the West is an empire comparable to ancient Rome. Several Western countries headed up their own empires, rather than being part of a Western empire, and competed with other Western countries in the quest for empire. Further, for much of this period the West was at war with itself. Even today, Europe struggles to maintain its unity on many issues, with Brexit being a sad example of European disunity.
And while China would be the equivalent of Rome’s Barbarians, the rise of China is only something which has occurred over the past few decades, and there are signs that the Chinese miracle could be fizzling out. The Chinese economy may stay large, meaning that it will remain a political power. But the greatest threat from China may come from instability generated by internal weaknesses, rather than its great power. So the analogy of the Rome/Barbarian analogy may not be the right one. Today, both the West and China have their troubles, and the future may be one of a troubled coexistence for the foreseeable future.
All that said, foreseeing the future is more imponderable than ever. Russia’s invasion has united the West more than it has been for a very long time. But there is a big question how long that unity can last, as the war in Gaza distracts and unsettles the West, and the spectre of a return of Donald Trump to the America presidency haunts the cohesion of the West.
In conclusion, Rapley and Heather’s book has an intriguing and thought-provoking hypothesis, and could still stimulate much brainstorming. But overall, its argument is interesting but not convincing.