ASIA
06 May 2023
The Ghost at the Feast: America and the Collapse of World Order, 1900-1941
Robert Kagan's new book on the history of US foreign policy offers many insights of relevance to today.
America’s record as an ambivalent and erratic liberal hegemon has deep roots, as analysed by Robert Kagan in his new book, “The Ghost at the Feast: America and the Collapse of World Order, 1900-1941”. Kagan is currently at the Brookings Institution in Washington, and through his career has reportedly influenced the thinking of both Mitt Romney and Barack Obama. This book is the second in a planned three-volume series on the history of US foreign policy, the first being Dangerous Nation: America's Place in the World from its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the 20th Century.
Kagan begins his narrative with America’s 1898 victory in its war with Spain, it continues to America’s belated decision to enter World War 1 and its subsequent retreat from international affairs, and then goes onto its belated intervention in World War 2 following the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour. The central theme, which is still relevant today, is how America grappled with the challenges of becoming a world power. The reader is able to appreciate such challenges as they were unfolding, rather than just looking back with the wisdom of hindsight, thanks to the meticulous presentation material on the complex discussions and politics behind US foreign policy decisions.
One case is that of Democratic President, Woodrow Wilson, who is often depicted as a failure due to his inability to secure Senate approval for the proposed League of Nations. Although he spent some six months in France for the post World War 1 Paris Peace Conference at Versailles, and American public opinion was in overwhelmingly favour of joining the League of Nations, the League became a victim of congressional politics. Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge led an assault which ultimately culminated in the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles. Lodge was more interested in pushing the Democrats out of the White House at the next presidential election (which he did) than sensibly crafting America’s foreign policy.
Kagen argues that global leadership was thrust on America around the beginning of the 20th century by the collapse of the British world order, the rise of Germany and Japan, and ultimately World War 1. The US had become the world’s leading economic power, and dominated the world economy even more than it would following World War 2. The new reality was that the US held the balance of power in world politics, and was the only country capable of ensuring a peaceful and democratic liberal world order.
And yet, then like now, Americans were ambivalent about their country’s power. For many Americans, their country is too big, far away and powerful to be vulnerable to foreign invasion, so they don’t want to worry about the rest of the world. So they are constantly running away from their power, and then being dragged back by the world – of going from indifference to panic, with nothing in between, as seen in its attitude towards China over the past 25 years. Thus, in 1919, the British diplomat Sir Harold Nicolson in 1919 called the inward looking America “the ghost at all our feasts”.
Perhaps shockingly for many Americans, Kagan argues that the US missed an opportunity at that time to save Europe from Hitler and World War 2. The problem was that the Europeans had massive World War 1 debts to the US ($10 billion at the time), and the US insisted on repayment. But as Germany was not paying France reparations, France was unable to repay its war debts. So it invaded the Ruhr area of Germany to enforce the reparations agreement.
According to Kagan, this invasion was the turning point that led to Germany's hyperinflation, the collapse of the Weimar Republic’s legitimacy in the eyes of the German people, and the rise of Hitler. The US could have easily addressed the issue by cancelling, reducing or forgiving European war debt. But the US refused to do so, despite cries for help from the US Ambassadors in Paris and Berlin, and also from all the European governments involved. In sum, the US lost a real opportunity to establish a lasting peace, and so as early as the 1920s, the world order already began collapsing, despite the apparent peace at the time.
According to Kagen, the Versailles Treaty was not a bad treaty which was too harsh on the Germans, as is often claimed. The real problem was the US’s withdrawal from the Treaty. The big issue of the day was how to ensure French security, while allowing Germany to get back on its feet. This is where the US was necessary to tilt the balance of power away from the rising power of Germany, as it did in both World Wars, but was unwilling to do so.
The US would suffer from great disillusionment from the consequences of World War 1. Thus, the 1920s would see the US turn inward with an America-first policy, combined with xenophobia, protectionism, anti-immigration sentiment, race problems and the rejection of internationalism – a portrait hauntingly similar to today’s America. Indeed, Kagan argues that the 1920 US presidential election was very much like the 2016 election.
One lesson that Kagan draws from American inaction after World War 1, is that it is possible, even today, for the US to maintain a reasonable peace in the world without conflict, if it is willing to be strong enough to deter adversaries. This means that the US and its allies and partners need to crank up military spending. However, Kagan believes the challenge coming from China is exaggerated, while his greatest concern is the possible return to the US presidency of Donald Trump, or a Trump-like figure, who could drag the US away from global leadership.
In writing this book, Kagan sought to get to the bottom of what really happened during this period, which is so distant yet feels so contemporary. And he certainly achieves this goal, even though there will always be those who interpret this period differently. The international and domestic politics of this period are critical to understanding the US, which remains the only country capable of defending the democratic, liberal order, even though it tends to make many mistakes along the way.
Kagan begins his narrative with America’s 1898 victory in its war with Spain, it continues to America’s belated decision to enter World War 1 and its subsequent retreat from international affairs, and then goes onto its belated intervention in World War 2 following the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour. The central theme, which is still relevant today, is how America grappled with the challenges of becoming a world power. The reader is able to appreciate such challenges as they were unfolding, rather than just looking back with the wisdom of hindsight, thanks to the meticulous presentation material on the complex discussions and politics behind US foreign policy decisions.
One case is that of Democratic President, Woodrow Wilson, who is often depicted as a failure due to his inability to secure Senate approval for the proposed League of Nations. Although he spent some six months in France for the post World War 1 Paris Peace Conference at Versailles, and American public opinion was in overwhelmingly favour of joining the League of Nations, the League became a victim of congressional politics. Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge led an assault which ultimately culminated in the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles. Lodge was more interested in pushing the Democrats out of the White House at the next presidential election (which he did) than sensibly crafting America’s foreign policy.
Kagen argues that global leadership was thrust on America around the beginning of the 20th century by the collapse of the British world order, the rise of Germany and Japan, and ultimately World War 1. The US had become the world’s leading economic power, and dominated the world economy even more than it would following World War 2. The new reality was that the US held the balance of power in world politics, and was the only country capable of ensuring a peaceful and democratic liberal world order.
And yet, then like now, Americans were ambivalent about their country’s power. For many Americans, their country is too big, far away and powerful to be vulnerable to foreign invasion, so they don’t want to worry about the rest of the world. So they are constantly running away from their power, and then being dragged back by the world – of going from indifference to panic, with nothing in between, as seen in its attitude towards China over the past 25 years. Thus, in 1919, the British diplomat Sir Harold Nicolson in 1919 called the inward looking America “the ghost at all our feasts”.
Perhaps shockingly for many Americans, Kagan argues that the US missed an opportunity at that time to save Europe from Hitler and World War 2. The problem was that the Europeans had massive World War 1 debts to the US ($10 billion at the time), and the US insisted on repayment. But as Germany was not paying France reparations, France was unable to repay its war debts. So it invaded the Ruhr area of Germany to enforce the reparations agreement.
According to Kagan, this invasion was the turning point that led to Germany's hyperinflation, the collapse of the Weimar Republic’s legitimacy in the eyes of the German people, and the rise of Hitler. The US could have easily addressed the issue by cancelling, reducing or forgiving European war debt. But the US refused to do so, despite cries for help from the US Ambassadors in Paris and Berlin, and also from all the European governments involved. In sum, the US lost a real opportunity to establish a lasting peace, and so as early as the 1920s, the world order already began collapsing, despite the apparent peace at the time.
According to Kagen, the Versailles Treaty was not a bad treaty which was too harsh on the Germans, as is often claimed. The real problem was the US’s withdrawal from the Treaty. The big issue of the day was how to ensure French security, while allowing Germany to get back on its feet. This is where the US was necessary to tilt the balance of power away from the rising power of Germany, as it did in both World Wars, but was unwilling to do so.
The US would suffer from great disillusionment from the consequences of World War 1. Thus, the 1920s would see the US turn inward with an America-first policy, combined with xenophobia, protectionism, anti-immigration sentiment, race problems and the rejection of internationalism – a portrait hauntingly similar to today’s America. Indeed, Kagan argues that the 1920 US presidential election was very much like the 2016 election.
One lesson that Kagan draws from American inaction after World War 1, is that it is possible, even today, for the US to maintain a reasonable peace in the world without conflict, if it is willing to be strong enough to deter adversaries. This means that the US and its allies and partners need to crank up military spending. However, Kagan believes the challenge coming from China is exaggerated, while his greatest concern is the possible return to the US presidency of Donald Trump, or a Trump-like figure, who could drag the US away from global leadership.
In writing this book, Kagan sought to get to the bottom of what really happened during this period, which is so distant yet feels so contemporary. And he certainly achieves this goal, even though there will always be those who interpret this period differently. The international and domestic politics of this period are critical to understanding the US, which remains the only country capable of defending the democratic, liberal order, even though it tends to make many mistakes along the way.