ASIA
17 September 2026
America’s diminished military preparedness
Under Donald Trump’s leadership, America has been shooting itself in the foot!
One of the most astonishing effects of America’s recent wars has been the depletion of its stocks of arms. America’s military-industrial complex, which produces its arms, was supposed to be one of the great pillars of America’s power machine.
Today, the US industrial base currently lacks the capacity and the flexibility to deter China, and to fight and win a protracted war in the Indo-Pacific, according to Seth Jones in his new book, The American Edge: The Military Tech Nexus and the Sources of Great Power Dominance (published in November 2025, before Donald Trump’s foray into Iran). He sees the US being in a similar position to Britain in the 1930s – both countries, being unprepared for a protracted conflict with their adversary.
America’s economic leadership – with a total GDP at market prices 55 percent bigger than that of China, and a GDP per capita is more than six times higher – is not enough to carry the day. Jones cites the wisdom of Yale historian, Paul Kennedy, that success in a long drawn out, protracted great power war often goes to the side with a more flourishing, industrial base.
How did the US get into such a pickle?
Following the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of a “unipolar world", President Bill Clinton understandably decided to slash defence spending. US defence spending has since been around 3 percent of GDP, much lower than during the Cold War. The big cut in defence spending left the US underequipped for today’s geopolitical tensions. The challenges of the US defence industry have been highlighted by how quickly US military supplies have been rundown by the wars in Ukraine and the Middle east.
China’s defence posture changed radically with the ascension of Xi Jinping to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012. He quickly announced his Chinese dream, "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation", of reviving China's status as an economic and military power. Xi asked his military to be prepared for conflict by 2027.
The US still leads the world for defence spending, but China's defence spending is soaring and its defence industry is on a wartime footing. China is catching up to the US in all the major military domains – maritime, land, air, space, cyber, and then nuclear – and it is building a force to deter and fight the United States if deterrence fails. Now, China has five defence industry companies in the top ten, up from zero a decade earlier. China’s industrial base is massive. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has the world's largest ground force, with around 2 million active personnel.
However, the PLA is not a 10 feet tall giant. It suffers from “peace disease”, meaning a lack of combat experience since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. China's defence industry and the PLA are also riddled with corruption, and its state-owned defence contractors have innovation and supply chain challenges.
The US has faced challenges in the past. In 1940, before the US entered World War II, President Roosevelt made a speech on the “Arsenal of Democracy”, in which he explained to the American people the imperative of preparing for the dangers ahead. He established the National Defense Advisory Commission which included the president of General Motors.
Production of the US defence industrial base, which was dwarfed by all other major powers in 1939, was dramatically ramped up within a few years. Many items were not made by typical defence companies. General Motors shifted its production lines from building cars to producing tanks, aircraft and other armaments. The Ford Motor Company halted civilian car production to produce tanks, airplane engines, and notably the B24 bomber. In sum, the US defence industrial dominance was substantially built by private entrepreneurs and innovators.
Jones discusses other examples where presidents led invigoration of the US defence industrial base. Faced with the threat of the Warsaw Pact’s numerical superiority in conventional forces, Presidents Eisenhower, Carter and Reagan strengthened America’s military edge for nuclear weapons, long-range bombers, stealth aircraft, precision-guided munitions, and space-based technologies.
Despite the challenge coming from China, the US still has significant strengths, according to Jones. It still has the world’s largest economy and defence budget. Its companies are innovative. The US is still dominant in such areas as aircraft carriers, submarines, particularly nuclear-powered submarines, fourth and fifth generation aircraft, and then nuclear weapons – although China is dominating the ship building.
Jones makes a strong case for revitalising the US defence industrial base to keep pace with China. But this requires leadership, prioritisation and a sense of urgency from the president of the United States. Leaders need to understand America’s current crisis and demonstrate leadership through bodies like Roosevelt’s National Defense Advisory Commission. Increasing defence spending is necessary. It is imperative to leverage America’s innovative tech sector. It is also necessary to increase investments in education and training for the defense industrial base. Cooperation with allies and partners is particularly important notably for shipbuilding, semiconductors, and anti-ship missiles, and also for providing access to critical raw materials which can reduce US reliance on China.
Today, the US industrial base currently lacks the capacity and the flexibility to deter China, and to fight and win a protracted war in the Indo-Pacific, according to Seth Jones in his new book, The American Edge: The Military Tech Nexus and the Sources of Great Power Dominance (published in November 2025, before Donald Trump’s foray into Iran). He sees the US being in a similar position to Britain in the 1930s – both countries, being unprepared for a protracted conflict with their adversary.
America’s economic leadership – with a total GDP at market prices 55 percent bigger than that of China, and a GDP per capita is more than six times higher – is not enough to carry the day. Jones cites the wisdom of Yale historian, Paul Kennedy, that success in a long drawn out, protracted great power war often goes to the side with a more flourishing, industrial base.
How did the US get into such a pickle?
Following the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of a “unipolar world", President Bill Clinton understandably decided to slash defence spending. US defence spending has since been around 3 percent of GDP, much lower than during the Cold War. The big cut in defence spending left the US underequipped for today’s geopolitical tensions. The challenges of the US defence industry have been highlighted by how quickly US military supplies have been rundown by the wars in Ukraine and the Middle east.
China’s defence posture changed radically with the ascension of Xi Jinping to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012. He quickly announced his Chinese dream, "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation", of reviving China's status as an economic and military power. Xi asked his military to be prepared for conflict by 2027.
The US still leads the world for defence spending, but China's defence spending is soaring and its defence industry is on a wartime footing. China is catching up to the US in all the major military domains – maritime, land, air, space, cyber, and then nuclear – and it is building a force to deter and fight the United States if deterrence fails. Now, China has five defence industry companies in the top ten, up from zero a decade earlier. China’s industrial base is massive. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has the world's largest ground force, with around 2 million active personnel.
However, the PLA is not a 10 feet tall giant. It suffers from “peace disease”, meaning a lack of combat experience since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. China's defence industry and the PLA are also riddled with corruption, and its state-owned defence contractors have innovation and supply chain challenges.
The US has faced challenges in the past. In 1940, before the US entered World War II, President Roosevelt made a speech on the “Arsenal of Democracy”, in which he explained to the American people the imperative of preparing for the dangers ahead. He established the National Defense Advisory Commission which included the president of General Motors.
Production of the US defence industrial base, which was dwarfed by all other major powers in 1939, was dramatically ramped up within a few years. Many items were not made by typical defence companies. General Motors shifted its production lines from building cars to producing tanks, aircraft and other armaments. The Ford Motor Company halted civilian car production to produce tanks, airplane engines, and notably the B24 bomber. In sum, the US defence industrial dominance was substantially built by private entrepreneurs and innovators.
Jones discusses other examples where presidents led invigoration of the US defence industrial base. Faced with the threat of the Warsaw Pact’s numerical superiority in conventional forces, Presidents Eisenhower, Carter and Reagan strengthened America’s military edge for nuclear weapons, long-range bombers, stealth aircraft, precision-guided munitions, and space-based technologies.
Despite the challenge coming from China, the US still has significant strengths, according to Jones. It still has the world’s largest economy and defence budget. Its companies are innovative. The US is still dominant in such areas as aircraft carriers, submarines, particularly nuclear-powered submarines, fourth and fifth generation aircraft, and then nuclear weapons – although China is dominating the ship building.
Jones makes a strong case for revitalising the US defence industrial base to keep pace with China. But this requires leadership, prioritisation and a sense of urgency from the president of the United States. Leaders need to understand America’s current crisis and demonstrate leadership through bodies like Roosevelt’s National Defense Advisory Commission. Increasing defence spending is necessary. It is imperative to leverage America’s innovative tech sector. It is also necessary to increase investments in education and training for the defense industrial base. Cooperation with allies and partners is particularly important notably for shipbuilding, semiconductors, and anti-ship missiles, and also for providing access to critical raw materials which can reduce US reliance on China.